How Takaful insurance can remediate to technical disequilibrium of Insurers in moral hazard situation?

DJAMAL TEBACHE

Résumé


This contribution aims to explain some advantages of Takaful model in order to remediate to the dilemma of technical equilibrium of insurers.

The question of markets inefficiency has arisen again because of the phenomenon, which is, new and old in the same time; this phenomenon is due to the asymmetric information. This situation is described in finance as a moral hazard. We will interest in this paper to this situation that is recurrent in insurance contracts, we will refer, also, to the expected utility theory, V.Newman and O. Morgenstern (1944), Akerlof(1970) analysis, to explain how can Takaful insurance remediate to this disequilibrium.

The obtained results show that, when the two parties to the contract cooperate each other for a single purpose as enacted by the mutual insurance and Takaful model, the probability of extreme states will be minimized, average wealth will be unchanged, risk and variance premium will be lower, and utility will be higher.


Mots-clés


Moral hazard, insurance companies, technical equilibrium, Takaful insurance hazard, insurance companies, technical equilibrium, Takaful insurance

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.48375/IMIST.PRSM/remses-v5i3.22860

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ISSN: 2489-2068

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