EFFETS DES FAUX FRAIS DANS LE TRANSPORT DE COQUILLES D’HUITRES DE MOUANKO

Henri NDAME MAKEMBE, Romuald Fernand TCHIEUZING AWOUTCHA, Salomon EBO’OH NTJEN

Résumé


Oyster is a free natural resource taken to Mouanko, but whose transport of the shell to  «Société de Provenderie du Cameroun », located in the town of Bafoussam, gives rise to false fees, which are a kind of illegal tax imposed on oyster shell transporters by road traffic controllers. This article shows the magnitude of these charges and specifies a model for minimizing their negative impact. The analysis of the data collected using a semi-directive interview with different actors, including municipal agents and shell truckers, shows that at 5% risk in a single trip fromMouanko to Bafoussam, each truck pays an average of false fees between 167,000 F CFA (254.78 €) and 169,000 F CFA (257.83 €). A principal-agent model type is proposed to enable the State to reduce the risk of social instability and enable greater economic efficiency.


Mots-clés


Oyster, shells, false fees, principal-agent model, economic efficiency. Index JEL : H3- Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents. N5- Agriculture ; Natural resources ; Environment extractive industries.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.48382/IMIST.PRSM/regs-v1i36.33947



ISSN : 2458-6250

Tout travail, soumis, soupçonné de piratage ou de plagiat engage entièrement son auteur soumissionnaire.