STRATEGIE D’ENRACINEMENT DU DIRIGEANT ET RICHESSE DES ACTIONNAIRES DANS LES ENTREPRISES CAMEROUNAISES

Thérèse MAI DJANGO WAMBE, Houly MENGA BIROUE

Résumé


In the agency relationship that unites the shareholders to the manager, each seeks to strengthen their bargaining power. This article analyzes the implications or consequences of this entrenchment on shareholders' wealth. The rooted model developed integrates membership in relational networks, the manager's participation in capital and specific investment to explain the distribution of wealth to shareholders. From a sample of 67 companies, we assessed the importance of the rooting of the leader on the wealth of shareholders. After the statistical tests carried out (the comparison test of means and simple linear regression), the processing was carried out using the SPSS data analysis software. It appears that the relational network and specific investment are negatively correlated with the wealth of shareholders. Indeed, a negative relationship would indicate that rooting is detrimental to shareholders and that the manager no longer seeks to maximize their wealth. The wealth of shareholders varies according to the manager's participation in the capital.

Mots-clés


shareholders, managers, roots, performance, corporate governance.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.48382/IMIST.PRSM/regs-v1i35.30700



ISSN : 2458-6250

Tout travail, soumis, soupçonné de piratage ou de plagiat engage entièrement son auteur soumissionnaire.