Algeria Elite’s Discourse of Hate: Making of Morocco an Enemy

Mliless Mohamed
m.mliless@edu.umi.ac.ma

Abstract
For decades, the Algerian elite have specialized in unjustified verbal attacks against Morocco. Academics, politicians, high-ranking retired military members, diplomats, parliamentary members, and media figures have launched a viral campaign against the kingdom. Their discourse is marked by hatred to make of Morocco an ‘enemy’ of the Algerian people. To analyze this issue, this study adopts critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine overtly expressed structures of hate and to argue that the discourse of the Algerian elite is aggressive, insulting, and threatening. Practically, recurrent hate speech acts embedded in metaphors and mental frames are pure and explicit incitement to violence. To explain the implications of these acts, the study relies on videos posted on YouTube across roughly two months from mid-July to August 2021. The choice of this time span is important because it represents a culminating point in the conflict between Morocco and Algeria due to the succession of these events: 1) the call of the Moroccan ambassador, Omar Hilal, to the United Nations during the meeting of non-aligned countries for the ‘independence of the Kabylia people’ in Algeria, 2) the Pegasus leak, 3) the outburst of violent forest fires in North Algeria and the lynching and immolation of a young activist in the courtyard of a police station in Kabilya, 4) the visit of the Israeli foreign minister to Morocco, and 5) the breakdown of diplomatic ties between the two countries. To attain the current study’s aims, 44 videos have been identified to cover the five stages. The results show that the Algerian elite’s discourse towards Morocco is full of hate, derogatory, and incites violence and racism. The many metaphors and mental frames adopted in the excerpts are to serve the political agenda of the state by making of Morocco an ‘enemy’.

Keywords: agenda setting, Algerian elite, dissimulated hate speech, mental frames, metaphor, Morocco
1. Introduction

Since the 90s increasing racism, ethnicism and xenophobia have been linked to ethnic minorities, immigrants, and refugees in North America and Europe [1]. Today, the surge of xenophobia, racism, hate, and intolerance is an alarming trend due to the rise of anti-Semitism, hatred of Muslims, and the persecution of Christians [2]. To spread hate and related behaviors, the mainstream media and social networks are platforms for fanatics and mongers of hate. They are not only platforms for social, political, and cultural debates but also are incubators of inflammatory narratives to stigmatize and dehumanize minorities, migrants, refugees, and anyone called ‘other’ [2]. No wonder, the discourse of hate flourishes within liberal democracies as well as authoritarian regimes. It has become a nuisance for states and a threat to individuals and groups because it imperils social stability and peace. Accordingly, ‘hate speech’ is defined as: “Any type of communication, whether it is oral or written expression or behavior, constituting an infringement or using pejorative or discriminatory language against a person or group because of their identity, in other words, religious affiliation, ethnicity, nationality, race, skin color, ancestry, gender or other factors constitutive of identity. Often these speeches are both the result and the cause of intolerance and hatred and can in some cases be disparaging and divisive [2]”.

Concerning incitement to hatred, Article 20 of the ICCPR described the concepts as being ‘among the strongest condemnations of hate speech’. It orders that ‘any propaganda for war [...] any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’. Should we regulate hate speech, or should we preserve freedom of expression? A dilemma that provoked debates on censorship and protection?

At first glance, this seems an insurmountable challenge because allowing freedom of expression while stopping hate speech, which targets people based on many differences (e.g., race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, gender, political orientation, disability, or even social condition), is concretely cumbersome. Freedom of expression as well as other basic human rights (e.g., freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) can be a source of difficulties and can nourish rhetoric of hatred. As studies in this issue attest, hate speech cannot be limited or even understood to be xenophobia in the first place [3]; it encompasses not only homophobia [4; 5; 6; 7], but can also target anyone who symbolizes a difference thus representing an out-group (Other) community [8; 9; 10]. It should be highlighted here that uncontrolled and unregulated action of hate and threat against individuals and groups under the flagship of the right of expression is not a process undergone by simple racists, extremists, or radicals. It is important to recall that hate and racism are not just manifested in streets or reactions of ordinary people in a social or economic impasse [1]. To explain this development, Teun A. van Dijk mentions that the racism of the elite is sometimes subtly and indirectly enacted or preformulated by various political elite groups. In fact, the situation is more complex and confused when emitters of these acts are academicians, politicians, and media figures. In this study, the language dissimulated in the Algerian elite’s discourse is full of hate, insults, verbal attacks, and threats. Hate speech is accounted for in this work as a means to extend and execute the Algerian political agenda. In the 44 videos, the present study identifies a set of metaphors and mental frames used to manipulate the Algerian public opinion that Morocco, the western neighbor, is the ‘enemy’ that threatens the existence of the state and the people alike. Often, the source of this hate speech among the Algerian elite is rendered to the political differences that the country has with Morocco over the kingdom’s sovereignty over the Sahara provinces. Recently, a study has revealed that hate speech largely dominates the news stories of the Algerian Press Service [11]. It has been shown and demonstrated that the Algerian press service (APS) makes Morocco its main concern and favors separatism and insecurity in Morocco. The discourse of the agency,
mentions the study, contains opaque and controversial doublespeak. The linguistic expressions used to represent the Moroccan Sahara are derogatory, defamatory, and hateful which, in turn, might hinder Moroccan efforts to restore its territorial integrity. Inciting hatred and enmity through language is a truth that the present study attempts to justify. Today, the incivilities of the Algerian elite are not different from those perpetrated by the rhetoric of the APS rhetoric which favors disunity and unrest in Morocco for more than four decades [11].

2. Review of the literature
The present study deals with a complex situation of discourse whereby dissimulated hate in the language is a strategy of argumentation that the Algerian elite adopt to make the population believe that Morocco is an enemy of the Algerian population. The discourse of the Algerian elite towards Morocco, whether explicit or implicit, is accompanied by verbal abuse and referred to in this work as covert and a dissimulated hate speech. The performativity of this discourse is accomplished by intense and vehement discursive figures (e.g., mental frames, metaphors) the aim of which is to raise national feelings and incite racial tensions [12; 13]. Hate speech, enacted by an in-group (Us) to denigrate and dehumanize an outer-group (Others), is most of the time done through language or images and shared on mainstream media and social networks [14; 15]. Based on metaphors or neologisms [16], negative representations and threat expressions might lead to insecurity based on the categorization of ‘Them / Us’ [17] or characteristic of hysteria attributed to women [18].

2.1. Dissimulated Hate Speech
This study is inscribed within a global strategy to unveil the process of demonization of others [19] as is the case with the manipulation of the Algerian elite. For so long, the ideology of the Algerian elite belongs to the institutionalized political stand for which hate speech is today a voice that replaces wisdom and peace. The bases of this discourse are essentially linguistic statements, formulas, not to mention the underlying hate ideology of the state that remains most of the time discriminatory towards Morocco. This section intends to explain the notion of dissimulated hatred at the center of a problematic relationship in which Algeria has been using all its energy for roughly five decades to make Morocco ‘enemy’ number one. To do this, we follow an approach in critical discourse analysis [1] which consists of treating hate declarations encapsulated in metaphors and the mental frames in relation to the conditions of production. The way meaning is produced in interaction with different parameters such as political agenda, context, geopolitics, ideology, the genre of discourse, and the social situation of emitters will be also examined. More precisely, concerning the discourse of the Algerian elite, this study is in line with the qualitative research carried out in CDA [1; 20]. Dissimulated hate is verbal violence [21] that is emitted by social actors of a given society to reveal their emotions, political aspirations, ideologies, and power. Importantly, dissimulated verbal violence has been analyzed in public space [22], at school [23; 24], in professional relations [25]. Similarly, dissimulated hate speech has been investigated in the context of social networks as an indicator of threat [26], a means of insult [27], and also a construct of digital hate speech [28].

2.2. Linguistics Propaganda Devices
Argumentation, as a form of language function, is a daily life activity used by all layers of societies and communities in order to negotiate, convince, and influence. It is a communicative process of advancing, supporting, criticizing, and modifying claims so that appropriate decision-makers, defined by relevant spheres, may grant or deny adherence [29]. The scope of this study is to investigate the use of argumentative techniques by the Algerian elite in standard Arabic manifested in the form of metaphors and mental frames to defend and support the state’s political choices. In relation to the issue under study, the use of metaphor is to achieve the elite’s
ascendancy, manipulation, and finally being believed by the public opinion. Metaphors are powerful linguistic means of meaning-making because they allow personifying abstract ideas and framing them the way people think. They are pervasive in everyday activities and language use [30]. Simply put, a metaphor is a transfer from the object to which it designates to another object that it designates by the process of analogy, comparison, ellipsis, or simile [31, 32]. The analysis of metaphors, as cited in many studies [33, 34, 35, 36, 37], presupposes that the analysis of metaphors is beyond the clear turn of a phrase. In relation to the Algerian elite’s discourse of hate, metaphors are best understood as speech hate acts particular to a way of meaning-making that centers on linguistic structures and concepts to draw similarities between ‘Morocco’ and ‘enemy’. The use of metaphor in elite’s hate speech is invested in relation to how the producers a) enact hate and manipulate the crowd, b) imbricate hate speech with mental images to make sense of their narratives, and c) engage in a receiver-centered communication and identify with potential audiences to anticipate reactions in favor of their political advocacy. Hate speech defames, belittles, or dehumanizes a class of people based on certain inherent properties — typically race, ethnicity, gender, or religion [38]. When attributed to the Algerian elite, hate speech is used to represent Morocco in negative qualities. Typically, the language used to construct Morocco as an ‘enemy’ relies on many mental frames that attempt to foster ‘immorality’, ‘inferiority’, ‘criminality’, ‘lack of cohabitation’, ‘untrustworthiness’, ‘greed’, and attempts to ‘threaten’ and to ‘dominate’ their neighboring countries. Usually, known methods of defamation typically include ‘Salient Exemplars’, ‘Extolling False Virtues’, and ‘Fallacious Metaphors’ [38]. George Lakoff argues that the most dangerous form of hate speech comes from governments when racist violence is fabricated to support governments’ policies. For instance, ‘Salient Exemplars’ refers to the use of highly rare and very ugly individual examples that have been sensationalized by the media and taking them as applying to the whole class. As for the second principle, George Lakoff means that ‘Extolling False Virtues’ of the opposite class suggests that the defamed class lacks those virtues. Of great importance to hate discourse, ‘Fallacious Metaphors’ lead the receiver to believe that the ‘Other’ is involved. To make of Morocco Algeria’s most feared enemy, the elite uses mental frames in addition to metaphors. In this direction, framing is presented as a process of assigning meaning to events in a way that benefits a cause [39]. Framing is the process of presenting a narrative in a way that is intended to gather support, mobilize adherents, and demobilize antagonists [40]. In this sense, our aim is to explore the role of framing among the Algerian elite’s hate discourse. In this work, we draw from theories of framing to understand how the elite is engaged in making Morocco an enemy of the Algerian state and people. The undeterminable waves of tensions between Morocco and Algeria have favored narratives of tension and insecurity among the Algerian elite to defend the country’s agenda, to manipulate the crowd for that, and to spread hateful content.

2.5. Morocco and Algeria differences
Historically, the conflict between the two countries is mostly linked to the issue of the Moroccan Sahara territory. The question of the Moroccan Sahara begins in the 60s of the twentieth century when Morocco asked for the recovery of the territories from Spain. Upon the Spanish denial, Morocco requested the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 18th of September, 1974 to provide its opinion on the issue. One month later, the court recognizes that the area ‘Was not a land without a master’ and confirms that there have been legal ties and allegiance between the Sultans of Morocco and the Sahrawi tribes. On the 28th of February, 1976 negotiations between Morocco and Spain ended with the departure of the Spanish troops from the Moroccan Sahara on 28 February 1976. Immediately, Algeria declared its opposition and mobilized its diplomacy to thwart the territorial integrity of Morocco. For the Algerian
regime, the completion of territorial integrity by Morocco constitutes a threat as it will make the Kingdom a serious competitor in the region. Then, Algeria created an armed guerilla called the ‘polisario front’ [41] to have an outlet on the Atlantic Ocean [42]. Four decades after the outbreak of the Moroccan Sahara issue, the problem has yet to find a final and consensual solution. On April 11, 2007, Morocco submitted an autonomy project draft to the United Nations that was qualified by one-hundred seventy members of the US House of Representatives as a ‘promising’, a ‘historic’, and an ‘innovative’ plan that provides a ‘realistic framework’ for a ‘negotiated political solution’ [43]. Lately, the Moroccan project has been favorably hailed by thirteen members of the council [44] who voted for the resolution, while Russia and South Africa abstained [45]. Despite explicit interference of Algeria in Moroccan internal affairs, the kingdom has always sought peace and direct negotiations with Algeria to terminate this conflict. The inflexibility of the Algerian political position regarding the conflict persists and the dispute with Morocco on the territories is far from being ended. The Algerian authorities, intelligence services, politicians, and media have tirelessly fuelled a climate of tension in a fragile region that is threatened by insecurity and terrorism [11].

In October 2010, unprecedented dangerous and violent escalations occurred in the city of Laayoune when the law enforcement dismantled an illegal camp constructed by pro-polisario activists. As a result, 11 law enforcement agents died and 70 were wounded among the law enforcement personnel and four among the civilians. Additional enormous material damage was generated due to public and private property arson. Recently, the declarations of five candidates for the presidency were explicit on that. On Friday, December 6th, 2019, a debate was broadcasted live on Algeria’s media to bring together five candidates (Ali Benflis, Abdelmajid Tebboune, Azzedine Mihoubi, Abdelaziz Belaïd, and Abdelkader Bengrina). They overtly expressed their vows to grant independence to the polisario front if anyone is elected president [46]. Faithful to the promises he made as a candidate, Abdelmajid Tebboune, now the Algerian president, qualifies Morocco as an “occupation force that must retreat from the area to grant independence to the Sahrawi population” [47] and reaffirms his will to defend the legitimacy and the right of the armed guerilla to get self-determination: “everybody in Algeria including the institutions, the politicians, and the army knows that it is a matter of occupation and it is decolonization” [48].

In the treatment of this issue, Algeria has deployed its media and elite to execute secessionist plans in the region. Usually, the language used to qualify this conflict is rife with hatred. Differently, a very friendly language is used to promote peace and stability in Libya and Mali the security of which is fundamental to Algeria [11]. The subordination of the political agenda to the elite will be investigated. Essentially, politicians, parliament members, the media, and non-governmental organizations in Algeria, consider that the issue of the Moroccan Sahara is a primary concern for the state [11]. During the months of July and August, the many disagreements between the two countries have taken a new turn on the diplomatic ties of the two countries. In his speech on the occasion of the Feast of the Throne, the Sovereign devoted a large part of his speech to the need for the two countries to open a dialogue without preconditions. His Majesty’s call to restore relations between Morocco and Algeria is added to a long list of ‘outstretched hand’: ليد الممتدة many times reiterated by the King. On the 30th of July, H. M. King Mohamed the Sixth complained about the ‘tensions’ with Algeria, invited its president ‘to allow wisdom to prevail’, and asked for the opening of borders between the two countries. His highness speech is interpreted as an ‘outstretched hand’ to make peace and stability triumph and that a new Moroccan-Algerian relation, based on wisdom and common interests, should be renewed. Unexpectedly, Algiers unilaterally announced the cessation of diplomatic relations with Morocco on the 24th of August 2021. Devoid of any justifications, Algerian built its decision on false accusations that Morocco is ‘constantly carrying out hostile actions’ and ‘waging war’ against the Algerian people and political leadership. Officially, the
Algerian Foreign Minister, Ramtane Lamamra, said that his country “rejects to be subjected to such acts and behaviors…. rejects the logic of the unilateral policies with their disastrous consequences on the peoples of the Maghreb region …. rejects to maintain abnormality which aims at retaining the countries of the Maghreb region within a constant state of insecurity”. What is more, Algiers accuses Morocco of complicity in the huge forest fires that have killed at least 90 people in the Kabylia region. The Moroccan response was immediate saying that the Algerian political moves were ‘completely unjustified but expected’. The present study focuses on the inclinations of the Algerian elite in promoting the Algerian propaganda and examines how the elite use mainstream media to promote the decisions undertaken by the regime. Added to the role of the Algerian media in spreading the ideology of the state [11], different elite in politics, non-government organizations, media figures, and academicians show their hatred towards Morocco contending that the country is an enemy that threatens the Algerian security. To examine this issue, the following research questions are formulated:

- Who is being targeted by the Algerian elite’s hate?
- What solutions do the elite provide to the problems they attribute to the out-group?
- How do the elite justify messages of hate?

3. Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Critical Discourse Analysis [1] is a conceptual framework applied in this study to examine how power, dominance, and manipulation are disseminated and reproduced in the Algerian elite’s discourse. Works on hate discourse applying CDA have examined structures of hate among the political elite [49] to study the implications of hate, racism, ethnocentrism, and anti-Semitism in society [50, 51], the manifestation of sexist and gender stereotypes in discourse [52], and the subtle ways through which social and ethnic groups are represented/misrepresented in discourse [53]. Geographically, CDA has examined the relationship between hate speech and violence in many parts of the world. These included mapping and organizing hate speech online in Ethiopia [54], stereotyping Chinese in the British and Hungarian far-right [55], constructing the other in Iran [56], using hurt feelings in Israel public discourse [57], using hate speech and discourse of terror threats in Nigeria [58, 59], communicating terrorist risk and threats in the Polish anti-immigration discourse [60], using hate speech in Rwanda [61, 62], inciting genocide and dangerous speech in Serbia [63, 64], using discourse on Bentiu massacre in South Sudan [65], expressing global battle over religious discourse in Sweden [66], using hate speech in Turkish Media [67], dehumanizing metaphors in UK immigration debates in the press and social media [68], and using animal-like metaphors to treat immigrant in the US public discourse [69, 70]. The choice of CDA permits the analysis of the Algerian elite’s talks and adopts a critical position to hate expressions. The CDA will orient this study in investigating utterances as well as social/sociological variables, the extension of hate among the Algerian elite, and the importance of metaphors and mental frames to make of Morocco an enemy of the Algerian state. Interestingly, what is considered as hate speech in the context of the Algerian elite is indeed a reflection of the political agenda that Algeria strives to enforce mainly when it comes to constructing Morocco as a ‘rogue state’ and Algeria a ‘victim’ of Morocco’s ‘perpetual aggressions’. The structures of hate adopted by the Algerian elite stem from an ideological vocabulary that dates back to the cold war era. The CDA carried out in this study is essentially based on qualitative data which adopts the analytical tools of content analysis to show and demonstrate how the Algerian elite relies on specific metaphors and frames to represent characteristics and features attributed to Morocco and how the Algerian political agenda and dominant ideologies are enacted and presented through hate speech. The analysis of hate speech data focuses on speeches and debates posted on YouTube from mid-July to the end of August 2021. This period witnessed intense conflict between Algeria and Morocco over five major political events:
1. Omar Hilal, Moroccan ambassador to the United Nations, calls for the ‘independence of the Kabyle people in Algeria during non-aligned countries’ meeting.
2. Pegasus leak.
3. Violent forest fires in Algeria and the killing of an Algerian activist.
5. Breakdown of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

3.2. Data Description
When state violence is no longer enough, individuals and in-groups ‘Us’ organize campaigns against out-groups ‘Others’ to accomplish different aims. The use of mainstream media by the Algerian elite to disseminate hate messages has been increasing over the last few months. Hate speech is not only growing in quantity, but it is also getting greater in terms of quality as the Algerian elite have been using it to construct of Morocco ‘an enemy of the Algerian state’; they therefore name Morocco as the classical enemy ‘العدو الكلاسيكي’، the western enemy ‘العدو الغربي’ and the bad neighbor ‘جار السوء’. The critical analysis of the video samples on hate speech of the Algerian elite focuses on 44 videos (see appendix 1, 2) posted by local and international mainstream media and social networks in July and August 2021, the months of intense political and diplomatic frictions between Morocco and Algeria. Specifically, hate speech occurs within regional and international context following the occurrence of five main events: 1) Omar Hilal, Moroccan ambassador to the United Nations, calls for the ‘independence of the Kabyla people’ in Algeria during non-aligned countries meeting, 2) the Pegasus leak, 3) Violent forest fires in Algeria and the killing of an Algerian activist, 4) Visit of the Israeli foreign minister to Morocco, and 5) the breakdown of diplomatic ties between the two countries. The samples were exclusively extracted from YouTube sites of local and international media outlets with related links (see appendix 2). All the videos were verified and approved by the study as belonging to the media channels.

Through the period of analysis, this study identified 44 videos posted by Algerian and international media channels devoted to the political tensions between Morocco and Algeria. For this aim, the media invited both Moroccans and Algerians to debate and analyze these differences. The focus in the present study is put on the reason why the Algerian elite, devoid of any justifications, adopt an overt hate discourse to express their views about the geopolitical context related to the five issues mentioned above. It is detailed in table 1 that 65 participants, the most recurrent figures in debates, were identified based on their social and professional occupations. Among this sample, 50 participants (76.9%) are academicians and university teachers of international law and human sciences, 5 politicians (7.6%), 5 media figures (7.6%), a member of the parliament, a retired diplomat, and 3 high ranking retired military members (4.6%). It is important to mention here that 5 women (10%) were identified as academicians who are university teachers of the law and international relations in Algerian universities.

Table 1. Algerian elite’s ideological affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>45 (90%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60 (92.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Media studies usually consider media agencies as platforms for social interaction and ideological construction where people express their opinion and beliefs about society, politics, economy, culture, and religion among other issues [71, 72, 73, 74], build up national discourse, and set agendas through the news content [74]. How mainstream media construct political perspectives based on hate discourse will be discussed in this section. It is debated in previous research [11] that the Algerian official press service APS (voice of the Algerian government) has been identified as a source of hate in that it has built all its policy on making Morocco its main concern and constructing of the country its most feared enemy. The same study qualifies the APS as a propaganda tool that promotes the political agenda of the Algerian state which, in turn, has been overtly supporting an armed guerilla to claim property over the Moroccan Sahara [11]. Once more, repeated hate speech among the Algerian officials and elite brings to the front the role of media in spreading the Algerian elite’s messages. We are in front of the elite discourse of hate, different from hate like cyber-bullying or cyber-stalking, by which hate targets a whole nation instead of an individual.

As illustrated in table 2, the Algerian elite’s speech of hate is framed and instrumentalized via local and international mainstream media. For instance, the data under examination pertain to 14 television stations among which six are local and 8 are international. It is noticed that the most known international stations are Russia Today Arabic, France 24 Arabic, BBC Arabic, and Aljazeera Arabic among others (see appendix 1). Eventually, the local TV stations are known for their political orientation as ultra nationalist platforms that organize debates and shows and invite the Algerian elite to set the political agenda of the state by making of Morocco a threatening enemy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Local and international mainstream media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL-Hiwar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albilad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ennahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elwatania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AlMamlaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alhayat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaraby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alhora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aljazeera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Interpretation of Results
The mainstream media and social networks have unprecedentedly become a means of hate communication when it comes to the relationship between Morocco and Algeria. The Algerian culture of hatred is now reaching the elite which blindly combine fallacious and unjustified claims to build its discourse and make of it an ideal tool to raise emotions and to construct a fanatic front that envies Morocco. The focus of our interpretations will be on the ‘out-group’ targeted by the Algerian elite’s discourse of hate, the solutions that the elite provides to solve
the problems attribute to Morocco, the formal and rationale justifications that the Algerian elite uses to justify its messages of hate, and the linguistic structures of hate that the elite adopts to make of Morocco its enemy. Differently, the interpretation will account for the way the elite’s narrative portrays Algeria as a ‘victim’ though nothing has been proven that Morocco has directly or indirectly been an aggressor.

Regrettably, hate speech has been the primary cause of many armed conflicts, crimes, and cultures of hate among different groups. Media have been blamed for their roles in fuelling hate speech among tension-soaked communities. In Rwanda, for example, hate speech, which was a weapon of the Hutus against the Tutsis, was one of the major causes of the Rwandan genocide where hate speech was extensively used in local radio stations that transmitted messages of hatred and incitement against the Tutsis [62]. Publications were also employed in Rwanda to disseminate ethnic hatred based on metaphors to denigrate and stigmatize the Tutsis community as an enemy [61]. In addition to the Rwandan case, Kenya’s post-election violence in 2008, Burundi’s election crisis of 2015, and the South Sudan conflicts are places where media contributed to the escalation of violence [49]. Similarly, Myanmar state media, publications, and social media have actively produced anti-Rohingya speech and influenced violent narratives about the Muslim community [75, 76]. The anti-Rohingya hate speech contributed to the rise of a political context where rights abuses against the group were excused.

Like in other countries, the roots of hate speech among the Algerian elite are multiple and originate in both the historical and the current geopolitical context. Unfortunately, hateful and ultranationalist speech is widespread and popular among this layer of Algerian society. It typically targets Morocco on many levels to make it an enemy of Algeria. The advent of new geopolitical events, particularly in July and August, pushed the elite to demark and side by the state and henceforth adapt and create hateful frames, expressions, and metaphors on media outlets. It is crystal clear that academicians, politicians, and media figures among others do not choose their language and cannot disguise their overt hatred across the media. Oftentimes, local and international media when they organize debates on the differences between Morocco and Algeria they instill and normalize a ‘culture of hate’ by communicating racism, envy, stereotypes, and prejudices. This research found that more than 60 intellectuals procure hate speech on media platforms. Although laypeople may not participate in these debates, their exposure to hate content can align with the elite and embrace its opinions. Because of the connectedness of the media, naïf people could be rapidly manipulated and radicalized; a process that might occur through minds’ influencing strategies and feelings raising appeals that simply drive ordinary people to execute ideas and principles hidden in hate discourse.

In addition to the elite, it should be reckoned that the Algerian press has been serving this agenda for many decades to promote instability and insecurity in Morocco [11]. This article attempts to show the overuse of hate words and expressions by the Algerian elite to explain how and what it executes the Algerian political agenda towards Morocco. The findings deeply connect to our hypothesis which stipulates that the discourse of the Algerian elite uses a double discourse full of hate to construct Morocco as an enemy of the state through Algerian and international media apparatus and to portray Algeria as a victim of the neighboring country. The discourse put forward for this aim is rife with fallacies constructed by the elite to tell the national and the international community that they are a victim of Moroccan illimitable diplomatic achievements. Explicitly, the offenses of the Algerian elite have become more recurrent and strident in the last two months (July and August) after a succession of events that Algeria considers aggressive. To understand this process, framing is applied to examine the way the elite builds its discourse of hate on the five events that took place through July and August. The unjustified allegations of the Algerian elite, as is the case of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, prove that Algeria intends to tell the Algerian people that they should gather around their government and have faith in the army to confront a common enemy who threatens day
and night the land of one million and a half martyr. To give impetus to this call, the Algerian minister of foreign affairs said the following:

History has shown that the kingdom of Morocco has never ceased to carry out hostile actions against Algeria… Moroccan propaganda and security services are waging a vile war against Algeria, its people and its leaders by spreading rumors and spreading malicious and inflammatory information [77].

4.1. Framing Morocco as an Enemy

To discuss the results related to the occurrence of metaphors and frames, a micro-level is used. The interpretation of linguistic constructs to qualify Morocco as an enemy includes nouns, adjectives, verbs, and modal verbs. In the excerpts, the connotations that language bears are extremely derogatory, negative, and defamatory that limits Morocco to an ‘occupier’ and a ‘traitor’, to be eradicated from the region. The elite’s qualifications represent Moroccan diplomatic achievements as a ‘provocation’, ‘equivocation’, ‘escalation’ towards Algeria, and therefore a ‘threat’ to the region. Additionally, the elite describes Morocco as a ‘failure’ an ‘aggressor’, who commits ‘atrocities’, ‘crimes’, and ‘barbarian’ acts against the ‘Sahrawi population’ and the Algerian population by supporting ‘terrorists’ to set fires on the Algerian forests. Apart from these frames, the Algerian elite, devoid of any politically correct manners and academic ethics, personifies Morocco as a ‘debauchery’, and ‘drug trafficking’ facilitator. In addition to nouns, adjectives are largely used in the APS language to qualify the Moroccan position in the conflict. In the news stories, the adjectives were morphologically reconstructed to reinforce the same impressions on Morocco as a ‘rogue state’, against the ‘international will’, and a ‘colonizer’ that ‘terrorize’ a ‘peaceful’ nation. Verbs were also used on a large scale to illustrate the actions taken by Morocco. To demonstrate the political stand of the agency towards the Moroccan Sahara conflict, many derogatory verbs were employed by the agency to describe the actions taken by the Moroccan officials and politicians. In this direction, the agency shows that Morocco is a country that ‘invades’ and ‘sies’ the land and ‘abuses’ power by attacking ‘civilians’ and ‘prevents’ freedom of expression by ‘conducting mass arrests’. Similarly, many biased verbs show that the Moroccan government ‘conducts’ tortures to ‘prevents’ and ‘prohibits’ peaceful protests. As for mental verbs, the texts denote a wide range of activities and states including cognitive meanings, emotional meanings expressing attitudes and desires, and receipt of communication. To illustrate this category of verbs, the news stories describe Morocco as a state that ‘panics’ in most of its decisions, ‘insists’ on its position, ‘despises’ and ‘denies’ others’ freedom, ‘disregards’, and ‘refuses’ the efforts afforded by the UN, ‘fails’ to convince the world community of its position, ‘blackmails’ and ‘abuses’ the natural resources, ‘irritates’ its neighborhood countries, and ‘engages’ and ‘persists’ in countering UN and the international law. Altogether, we argue that these verbs are provocative and convey nothing but hate towards Morocco. The article published this week on the Arabic version of the British BBC’s electronic portal [78] highlights the tactics used by the Algerian government to ‘blame foreign actors for being the source of its political and social crises’. In details, the article explains how the Algerian political and military powers ‘manipulate the population’ and systematically ‘use the law to silence and apprehend militants and protesters’. Dramatically, the article recognizes that the country is ‘more and more enclosed’ in a country where the population is ‘oppressed under the rule of a dictatorship that holds the country with an iron fist’. This situation, says the article, ‘lasts since the country’s independence in July 1962’, with the same political and military tactics. Faced with this obscure and unknown situation that is affecting areas of life and economic sectors of the country, the Algerian regime ‘constantly designates a responsible who is none other than the Moroccan neighbor’. In line with the arguments mentioned in the article of the BBC, this study underlines that ‘making of Morocco an enemy’ is an old tactic to ‘divert the attention of the Algerian public opinion’. From
the ‘spectacular failure of the regime in dealing with domestic problems’ such as fire fires forest, the Covid-19 pandemic, and unemployment.

4.2. Framing Algeria as a Victim

This section examines the use of linguistic patterns used by the elite to build a victim image around the country. The content analysis of the narratives reflects that Algeria is a country of good faith and does not intervene in its neighbor’s internal affairs. To reinforce this position, the elite describes Algeria as a nation that bears a ‘noble position’ by improving ‘solidarity’ with depressed communities and people who seek freedom and self-determination including the ‘Palestinians’ and the ‘polisario front’. It is repeated in the elite discourse that Algeria derives this ‘humanitarian responsibility’ from a ‘legitimate historical background’ as a land of ‘mujahedeen’ and ‘Pan-Africanism’. This is crystallized in an endless of linguistic patterns which show that Algeria flagrantly interferes in the Moroccan Sahara issue, and the Algerian elite's political moves imbricated in the narratives are to promote instability in the region. To illustrate this point, some examples are taken from the data to stress that they blindly execute the country’s political agenda. During July and August 2021, the Algerian intellectuals and politicians say that since Donald J. Trump former president of the United States of America recognized the Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara provinces [79, 80, 81], the kingdom has decreased its aggressions and bullies towards Algeria. The linguistic structures used to victimize Algeria seems to forge a mental model underpinning that Algeria assumes the burden of a ‘rogue state’ that has ‘lost direction’ and ‘threatens security and stability' in the region. Added to this, the Algerian elite repeatedly say that youth is a victim of systematic trafficking of drugs that inundates the Algerian society. This is fallacious for the simple reason that all borders with Morocco are shut and put under high surveillance. The Algerian elite never mention the tremendous quantity of cocaine that has been seized in the port of Oran city, North West of the country, and many other operations that were organized and orchestrated by military officials. Regarding the Pegasus affair, the Algerian elite claimed that the country was ‘victim of a vast espionage operation’ carried out by the ‘Moroccan neighbor’, at a time when the country was going to experience a ‘major political shift’. In addition, the Algerian elite is leading a fierce campaign against Morocco accusing it without any justification or proof as ‘being behind a wave of espionage’ which has targeted many ‘Algerian officials’. These allegations were denied by the Moroccan authorities who launched a legal suit before the French courts against the triggers of this case by ordering them to provide tangible proofs within ten days.

Concerning the visit of the Israeli foreign minister to Morocco, the Algerian elite perceive that Morocco has ‘transcended all the lines of morality’. As it is repeated by all academicians, politicians, and media figures among others, Morocco has not respected the ‘bonds of fraternity’ and ‘good neighborhood’, adding that Morocco has blatantly declared its ‘hostility to the Algerian people’ (victim) by ‘supporting terrorists’ who are serving ‘an evil agenda’ which aims to ‘dismantle and dislocate the Algerian people’ (victim) and to ‘provoke ethnic and ideological conflicts’ in the country (victim).

Following these recurrent and hostile actions against Algeria (victim), the discourse of the elite brings to the front fallacious and malicious declarations made by the Algerian foreign minister who has once again contributed to the complexity of the situation. Concerning the declarations of the Israeli minister of foreign affairs in Rabat about the malignant rapprochement between Iran and Algeria, all the participants accuse Morocco of being the instigator of a new alliance which will ‘harm the regional role of Algeria’ and ‘jeopardizes its relations with African countries’ (victim). The elite specifies that this move mirrors the will of Morocco ‘to involve the enemy of the Umma’ (Arabs and Muslim countries) in a ‘hazardous adventure against Algeria’, its ‘values’, its ‘positions’, and its ‘principles’ as the ‘last preserver of freedoms’, the
‘protector of just causes’, and the ‘guarantee of rights and self-determination of peoples’ (victim).

Despite the outstretched hand to the Algerian leaders, repeated in the last speech of the Feast of the Throne, H.M King Mohammed VI called again the Algerian leadership to resume dialogue between the two countries. Hostilities and verbal provocations of the Algerian officials and the elite were the only answers to the call of peace. Again, in a statement made public on August 18th, the Algerian presidency mentions that Morocco was an ‘accomplice to the fires’ that have burnt large parcels of forest in the Kabylia region. The elite favored the decisions taken by the state upon the ‘hostile acts’ that required ‘the revision of relations between the two countries’ and the ‘intensification of security controls at the western borders’ of the country. As usually, the allegations, be it of the state or the elite, are without justifications. Still, all the participants in the 44 videos accuse the MAK, a group they forcefully affiliate to Morocco, of being at the origin of the fires. Indeed, the accusation is of a conspiratorial nature which aims to amplify the tensions between Algiers and Rabat. The MAK, recently designated as a terrorist organization, is a political movement which militates for the auto-determination of the Kabyla region.

Victim and related derivations (victimization and victimizer) refers to socio-psychological discursive whose manifestations are found in a large number of discourses ranging from ordinary discourse to scientific, media or legal discourse. To prove that an individual or a group is victim, the following criteria [82, 83] will be checked to see if: 1) the aggression is physical or verbal, and therefore the damage perpetrated is physical or psychological, 2) the victim is de facto direct or potential indirect. We thus find that the qualification of a victim is not neutral. For a subject to fall under the status of ‘victim’, a judgment must be made by the person who has suffered damage or by a third party who has observed the condition of the person in question. This judgment takes into consideration the condition of the person who has suffered the damage and the nature of the process which caused the damage.

The construction of Algeria as a ‘victim’ state covers a broad spectrum of questions on these realities. Algeria has always claimed that its neighbor is causing problems related to drug trafficking and spyware. More serious than that, Algeria is accusing Morocco of supporting terrorist organizations affiliated to MAK and RASHAD which, according to its foreign minister, set fire to the north of the country and participated in the lynching of the young Jamal Ben-Smail. However, Algeria has never provided any pieces of evidence to show the world that Morocco has been the source of these happenings. These practices and methods which reflect certain blind propaganda are now reproduced by the elite and built around a conception of ‘victimization’ they handle through hate speech to obtain satisfaction from the political regime in place and to receive recognition and sympathy from other countries. In the current debates of the Algerian elite, the feeling of ‘being victim’ is felt frequently in the speeches they circulate on local and international media. Indeed, presenting oneself as a ‘victim’ or being described as such by the educated elite is unfortunately pathetic. Once again, we observe an ethical drift among the Algerian elite, a peculiarity that we noticed among the Algerian official media [11]. This reinforces our argument that all Algerian officials, regardless of their ideological or intellectual occupation, are strongly committed to damaging the image of Morocco by constituting it as an ‘enemy’ and claiming that Morocco ‘attacks a friendly and brother state’.

4.3. Hate Speech and the Rabat Plan of Action Threshold

To qualify and understand the Algerian elite’s ‘hate speech’ that targets an identifiable group, the discourse must fit within the criteria of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, known under the name of Rabat Plan of Action (RPA), where the speaker implicitly or explicitly seeks to incite an ‘in-group’ to take any action against an ‘out-group’ based on a particular justification. Article 20
of the ICCPR requires “a high threshold on categorizing a given discourse is hateful”. In this respect, RPA (A/HRC/22/17/Add.4) provides a six-part threshold test (see appendix 3) to be fulfilled for a statement to be qualified as a criminal offense: 1) context, 2) speaker, 3) intent, 4) content and form, 5) extent of the speech act, and 6) the likelihood that includes imminence. Concerning the social and political ‘context’ prevalent at the time hate speech statements were made, the Algerian elite is likely to incite discrimination, hostility or violence against Morocco and may have a direct bearing on a small community of Moroccans living in Algeria. Secondly, the RPA assumes that the ‘Speaker’s Position or Status’ in the society should be considered. In this direction, the Algerian elite stand in the context of the audience to whom the speech is directed. Third, the threshold of the RPA cited in Article 20 of the ICCPR anticipates ‘Intent’ as a required criterion which discards hate based on negligence and qualifies an act to be an offense when there is a triangular relationship between the object and subject of the speech act as well as the audience. Fourth, the ‘Content and Form’ of hate speech constitutes a critical element of incitement. In this sense, the Algerian elite’s speech is provocative and direct in that there is an alignment between form, style, and the nature of arguments deployed in the speech to portray Morocco in an image that is false and erroneous. Five, the ‘Extent’ of the speech act includes elements such as the reach of the speech act, its public nature, its magnitude, and the size of its audience.

The Algerian elite’s speech act of hate is frequent and publically enacted through local and international mainstream media. Finally, ‘Likelihood’, including ‘Imminence’ refers to incitement. The actions advocated through the Algerian hate speech carry a degree of risk of harm that must be dealt with. We fear that hate speech would succeed in inciting actual action against Moroccans who live in Algeria or at the diaspora. With regards to the criteria advanced by the RPA, producers of hate speech among the Algerian elite as well as potential perpetrators of incidents, which indeed reach the threshold of Article 20 of the ICCPR, should be put under the law and punished. At least, the Algerian elite should abide by norms and ethics related to their social and professional position. What is more, they need to embrace a wise and moderate discourse and denounce firmly and promptly any form of hate speech and state clearly that the use of hate speech to incite violence can never be tolerated as a response to political and ideological differences between nations.

4.4. Internal Aims of the Elite’s Discourse

Let us establish a link between the Algerian elite’s discourse of hate and its potential outcomes on the public opinion within Algeria. The most controversial, but extremely respected and quoted intellectual ever, Noam Chomsky, has compiled a list of the ten most common and effective strategies used by propaganda operators to establish a manipulation of the population through the media [84]. Concerning the issue at hands, only three strategies which are good enough to understand the implications of the Algerian elite’s discourse of hate are listed as: the ‘Strategy of Distraction’, ‘Create Problems and Offer Solutions’, and the ‘Gradual Strategy’ are the ones that show how far discourse of hate can be implemented even by the most intellectual and erudite of the Algerian society by using distraction to manipulate the public opinion around the idea that Morocco is an enemy and a very hostile neighbor who ‘supports terrorist groups of MAK and RASHAD’, seeks to ‘harm Algeria’, and ‘complots with foreign powers (Israel)’ to ‘destabilize’ its territorial integrity. The strategy of distraction, the primary element of social control aims at diverting public attention from important issues and changes determined by the political and economic elite via the technique of flooding continuous distractions and insignificant information [84]. This strategy is commonly used among the Algerian elite to divert attentions and prevent the public from getting the essential knowledge.
including internal and external state policies. The populist discourse of hate embraced by the Algerian elite not only maintains public attention ‘diverted’ away from the real social problems, but it keeps the public busy and concerned with marginal facts that the elite strives to make of them a priority of the laymen. Furthermore, Chomsky proposes that creating problems and then offering solutions fits the argumentative and reasoning process of the Algerian elite discourse of hate. For example, the Algerian elite attributes what happened inside the country to an external actor (foreign hands: ايادي خارجية) for which no tangible and material justification is provided. Therefore, intensifying forest fires or arranging for ethnic violence is likely to push the public to ask for tougher security measures and policies to the detriment of the popular uprising (Hirak: حراك) and to the solution of economic crisis (problem of liquidity: مشكلة السيولة). On the contrary, the elite plead for the decision of the country to create another front of tension that would finally culminate by breaking the ties with the enemy, the evil country responsible for all problems inside Algeria.

Finally, the ‘gradual strategy’, or acceptance, is linked to the measures taken by the authorities to make the unacceptable accepted. The discourse of the elite discussed in this article is inscribed within this framework. To back up the state’s policy and agenda towards Morocco, the elite is called to voice and maintain the political stands of Algeria in a gradual way over four decades. Externally, this is how the drift of the political agenda took place and was imposed since the mid-seventies. Internally, unemployment, precariousness, lower wages, and a decent life among so many social, political, and cultural issues are deliberately neglected and overlooked by the elite.

**Conclusion**

The Algerian elitist system is not only becoming outdated but also extremely dangerous. It is logical and evident that the elite pertaining to different professional and cultural backgrounds must ally with the reality and the complexity of humanity. Above all, it should combat discourse of hate and disunity towards other nations, focus on development issues, the recurrence of pandemics, the outburst of environmental challenges, the resolution of religious and cultural tensions, and the promotion of the principles of peace and cohabitation. Regrettably, it must be recognized among the Algerian elite a deliberate inability to free itself from the grips of the political and ideological orientations and to reject certain methods and practices maintained by the political system. For more than four decades, Algeria has always reincarnated a discourse
of conspiracy. Whenever there are internal tensions, the Algerian government brandishes the fear of the ‘foreign hand’ to occupy public opinion with an imaginary enemy that threatens the country. The strategy of distraction which seems to work with the Algerian state is maintained more than ever by the elite on the media and social networks. The role of academicians, politicians, senior military personnel, parliamentary members, former diplomats, leaders of the political parties, and figures of the media is totally aligned with the thesis of the political system ‘to make Morocco an enemy of Algeria’.

About the Author

Dr. Mohamed MLILESS holds a PhD in Applied Linguistics. He published three books on legal and environmental discourse. The many scientific articles he authored and coauthored focused on social and environmental issues. Dr. MLILESS is a member of the International Ecolinguistics Association (IEA), a member of the London Journals Press, and a member of Acta Scientific Open International Library, India, and a board member of ARBITRER journal in Indonesia. Last but not least, Dr. MLILESS is a review board member of many journals including the Journal of Education Teaching and Social Studies (JETSS), the Journal of Sustainability in Environment, International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology (IJSA), International Journal of English and Literature (IJEL), African Journal of Political Science and International Relations (AJPSIR), Journal of Language and Literature (JOLL).

Appendix 1. Data Technical Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translated Titles</th>
<th>Media Outlet</th>
<th>Elite’s Names</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A crisis between Algeria and Morocco. Who is responsible?</td>
<td>RT TV</td>
<td>Anouar Malek</td>
<td>Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria-Morocco: In which direction are the relations heading?</td>
<td>Fr. 24 TV</td>
<td>Mohamed Amroun</td>
<td>Academician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My participation on Russia Today after Algeria summoned its ambassador to Morocco.</td>
<td>RT TV</td>
<td>Noreddine Khatal</td>
<td>Media Figure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With arguments and evidence, the response to the insults of the Moroccan ambassador to the United Nations against Algeria

The Kas Sareed project is postponed until further notice and the consequences of the estrangement between Algeria and Morocco

MAK RASHAD The Zionist alliance the square of terrorism against Algeria

The Makhzen regime is attacking Algeria again

The Makhzen ally of Zionists is attacking the territorial integrity of Algeria

The Algerian supreme security council: We will reconsider relations with Morocco. Possible scenarios

Algerian Foreign Ministry: Morocco is leading a dangerous adventure with Israel against Algeria

The Army revues responds to the Makhzen maneuvers: compromising an inch of the national territory is madness

Algeria stresses the unity and safety of Libya and Tunisia the Makhzen continues its maneuvers

Morocco is weak and cowardly, and it cannot go free of its own volition

Tunisia and Algeria must lead the Maghreb Union and the Arab peoples will join the ranks by not normalizing with Israel

These are the reasons for the breakdown of diplomatic ties between Algeria and Morocco

Morocco recalls its ambassador to Morocco is relations heading towards a diplomatic rupture?

Morocco a systematic hostile approach to Algeria

YouTube channel

Abderrahman Ben Chrite

Brahim Mira

Moujamaa Souljah

Abdelaziz Mjahed

Farouk Tifour

Smail Dabbach

Med Ali Rbij

Mohamed Amroun

Ali Khalaf Allah

Mohamed Ali Rbij

Radwan Bouhibel

Riad Al-Sidawi

Mustapha Saiaj

Ibtisam Hamlaoui (W)

Abir Najoua (W)

Noreddine Khatal

Media Figure

Academician

Academicians

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician

Academician
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>I visited Morocco in 2007 and I swear to God that the Moroccan people love and respect Algerians</td>
<td>Echourouk TV</td>
<td>Ramadan Hamlat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Algeria and Morocco between calls to resolve differences and cold responses</td>
<td>AlMamlaka TV</td>
<td>Zouhair Bouamama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>The Moroccan regime has become a weapon in the hands of the Zionists</td>
<td>Elwatania TV</td>
<td>Ismail Dabbach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Crisis Program 08/25/2021</td>
<td>Alhayat TV.</td>
<td>Mediouni Mokhtiar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Al-Hayat channel announcer: After interrupting ties with the Makhzen, “either we are with Algeria or we are against it”</td>
<td>Alhayat TV.</td>
<td>Zaki Alilat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>the Algerian parties welcome the decision to cut ties with Morocco</td>
<td>Alaraby TV</td>
<td>- Nadir Boulakroun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Morocco regrets Algeria’s decision to cut diplomatic ties with it</td>
<td>Alhora TV</td>
<td>Mohamed Ali Rbj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Diplomacy fails to resolve Algerian-Moroccan disputes</td>
<td>Alhora TV</td>
<td>Abderazzak Saghrou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Alhayat 10/17/2021</td>
<td>Alhayat TV</td>
<td>- Ouahid Boutrik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Crisis Program 1.24/08/2021</td>
<td>Alhayat TV</td>
<td>- Noureddine Joudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Morocco and Algeria: Will the crisis escalate after the severing of relations between the two countries?</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Taoufik Boukaada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Western Sahara - United Nations: Will the appointment of a new representative of the Secretary-General revive the course of negotiations?</td>
<td>France 24</td>
<td>Mohamed Ben Khrouf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Algeria cuts diplomatic ties with Morocco</td>
<td>Aljazeera Ar.</td>
<td>Zouhair Bouamama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 2. Videos ’Links on YouTube**

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A crisis between Algeria and Morocco. Who is responsible?</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdIpP3UMxc">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdIpP3UMxc</a></td>
<td>29:53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Algeria-Morocco: In which direction are the relations heading?</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSncS7Srxyo">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSncS7Srxyo</a></td>
<td>39:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>My participation on Russia Today after Algeria summoned its ambassador to Morocco.</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eGVCWLyGig">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eGVCWLyGig</a></td>
<td>29:49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>With arguments and evidence, the response to the insults of the Moroccan ambassador to the United Nations against Algeria</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=71u0TT1aFQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=71u0TT1aFQ</a></td>
<td>25:08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Kais Saied project is postponed until further notice and the consequences of the estrangement between Algeria and Morocco</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZhoZFxtCtw">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZhoZFxtCtw</a></td>
<td>51:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MAK RASHAD The Zionist alliance the square of terrorism against Algeria</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bftF8ASbH4">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bftF8ASbH4</a></td>
<td>44:44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Makhzen regime is attacking Algeria again</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHJaUND_0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHJaUND_0</a></td>
<td>18:34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The Makhzen ally of Zionists is attacking the territorial integrity of Algeria</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmDkkBtxMr8">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmDkkBtxMr8</a></td>
<td>50:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The Algerian supreme security council: We will reconsider relations with Morocco. Possible scenarios</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8TzD388_is">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8TzD388_is</a></td>
<td>37:44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Algerian Foreign Ministry: Morocco is leading a dangerous adventure with Israel against Algeria</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GePSzYK00o">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GePSzYK00o</a></td>
<td>40:42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The Army revues responds to the Makhzen maneuvers: compromising an inch of the national territory is madness</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0waFkJZ2aK">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0waFkJZ2aK</a></td>
<td>12:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Algeria stresses the unity and safety of Libya and Tunisia the Makhzen continues its maneuvers</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72U14vLSvE">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72U14vLSvE</a></td>
<td>20:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Algeria and Morocco who is going to lose if the gas pipeline is canceled?</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7YQrQGRIYQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7YQrQGRIYQ</a></td>
<td>28:44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The Pegasus scandal, this is how the Makhzen and its Zionist ally spy on Algeria</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXp91QtT734">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXp91QtT734</a></td>
<td>20:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>The Makhzen loses the compass</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yp1EIYoJl-k">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yp1EIYoJl-k</a></td>
<td>49:52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Morocco is weak and cowardly, and it cannot go free of its own volition</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GJd1DZqyq">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GJd1DZqyq</a></td>
<td>20:09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Tunisia and Algeria must lead the Maghreb Union and the Arab peoples will join the ranks by not normalizing with Israel</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kGi_P0uykwU">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kGi_P0uykwU</a></td>
<td>13:32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Morocco is worth nothing if compared to Algeria</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ht8Xhec358s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ht8Xhec358s</a></td>
<td>15:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>These are the reasons for the breakdown of diplomatic ties between Algeria and Morocco</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdyG_tNeXz">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdyG_tNeXz</a></td>
<td>41:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>private Show 24 august 2021</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suy_nDJFJtg">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suy_nDJFJtg</a></td>
<td>1:39:36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Algeria Live 18 august 2021</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOmAnkJhDI&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=1">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOmAnkJhDI&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=1</a></td>
<td>1:11:34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Algeria Live 17 august 2021</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5doMhosOseM&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=1">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5doMhosOseM&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=1</a></td>
<td>1:29:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Algeria Live 08 august</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5doMhosOseM&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=2">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5doMhosOseM&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=2</a></td>
<td>28:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Algeria Live August 01 2021</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGXvXV_4kTw&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=1">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGXvXV_4kTw&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=1</a></td>
<td>1:35:43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Algeria Live July 27 2021</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5Jr7s58JKLk&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=2">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5Jr7s58JKLk&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=2</a></td>
<td>1:16:02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Algeria Live July 26 2021</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qGzcZ67l4MB1&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=10">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qGzcZ67l4MB1&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOl4J5FYPbvoWm&amp;index=10</a></td>
<td>1:18:36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Algeria Live July 25 2021 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85KLPtEIc_c&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOL4rJSFY9psw6Wm&amp;index=11">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85KLPtEIc_c&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOL4rJSFY9psw6Wm&amp;index=11</a></td>
<td>1:20:24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Algeria recalls its ambassador to Morocco is relations heading towards a diplomatic rupture? <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m70PpjrXxU&amp;t=168s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m70PpjrXxU&amp;t=168s</a></td>
<td>29:48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Algeria Live July 18 2021 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18kXkk0Dz8w&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOL4rJSFY9psw6Wm&amp;index=15">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18kXkk0Dz8w&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOL4rJSFY9psw6Wm&amp;index=15</a></td>
<td>1:13:52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Algeria Live</td>
<td>06-08-2021 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15p1b9zdU&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOL4rJSFY9psw6Wm&amp;index=34">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15p1b9zdU&amp;list=PLKpn09pt34-cz_S62eAOL4rJSFY9psw6Wm&amp;index=34</a></td>
<td>1:13:52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Morocco a systematic hostile approach to Algeria <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stb0L2jz3jE&amp;t=173s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stb0L2jz3jE&amp;t=173s</a></td>
<td>39:59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>I visited Morocco in 2007 and I swear to God that the Moroccan people love and respect Algerians <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY8ajMNlmx0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RY8ajMNlmx0</a></td>
<td>16:20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Algeria and Morocco between calls to resolve differences and cold responses <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SS5D6VigY&amp;t=133s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SS5D6VigY&amp;t=133s</a></td>
<td>20:14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>The Moroccan regime has become a weapon in the hands of the Zionists <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTXqCLr0xK">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTXqCLr0xK</a></td>
<td>10:16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Crisis Program 08/25/2021 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VZCz88BV0&amp;t=48s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VZCz88BV0&amp;t=48s</a></td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Al-Hayat channel announcer: After interrupting ties with the Makhzen, “either we are with Algeria or we are against it” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XT11hs02ss">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XT11hs02ss</a></td>
<td>3:45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>the Algerian parties welcome the decision to cut ties with Morocco <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch1TAHCQzBm">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch1TAHCQzBm</a></td>
<td>15:30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Morocco regrets Algeria's decision to cut diplomatic ties with it <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch1TAHCQzBm">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch1TAHCQzBm</a></td>
<td>21:52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Diplomacy fails to resolve Algerian-Moroccan disputes <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMZIE-qqY2c">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMZIE-qqY2c</a></td>
<td>51:16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Alhaya 10/17/2021 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYyUR1w0f0s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYyUR1w0f0s</a></td>
<td>51:30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Crisis Program</td>
<td>124/08/2021 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZzTV5hSotf&amp;t=218s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZzTV5hSotf&amp;t=218s</a></td>
<td>51:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Morocco and Algeria: Will the crisis escalate after the severing of relations between the two countries?</td>
<td>point of discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Western Sahara—United Nations: Will the appointment of a new representative of the Secretary-General revive the course of negotiations? <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWKa-vxXMew">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWKa-vxXMew</a></td>
<td>24:40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Algeria cuts diplomatic ties with Morocco <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLKYzYnDVG0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLKYzYnDVG0</a></td>
<td>58:28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3. Threshold Test of the Rabat Plan of Action

Article 20 of the ICCPR requires a high threshold on categorizing a given discourse as hateful. In this context, The Rabat Plan of Action (A/HRC/22/17/Add.4) provides a six parts threshold test to be fulfilled in order for a statement to amount to a criminal offence: 1) context, 2) speaker, 3) intent, 4) content and form, 5) extent of the speech act, and 6) likelihood that includes imminence (see appendix below).

1- **Context**: Context is of great importance when assessing whether particular statements are likely to incite discrimination, hostility or violence against the target group, and it may have a direct bearing on both intent and/or causation. Analysis of the context should place the speech act within the social and political context prevalent at the time the speech was made and disseminated;

2- **Speaker**: The speaker’s position or status in the society should be considered, specifically the individual’s or organization’s standing in the context of the audience to whom the speech is directed;

3- **Intent**: Article 20 of the ICCPR anticipates intent. Negligence and recklessness are not sufficient for an act to be an offence under article 20 of the ICCPR, as this article provides for “advocacy” and “incitement” rather than the mere distribution or circulation of material. In this regard, it requires the activation of a triangular relationship between the object and subject of the speech act as well as the audience;

4- **Content and form**: The content of the speech constitutes one of the key foci of the court’s deliberations and is a critical element of incitement. Content analysis may include the degree to which the speech was provocative and direct, as well as the form, style, nature of arguments deployed in the speech or the balance struck between arguments deployed;

5- **Extent of the speech act**: Extent includes such elements as the reach of the speech act, its public nature, its magnitude and size of its audience. Other elements to consider include whether the speech is public, what means of dissemination are used, for example by a single leaflet or broadcast in the mainstream media or via the Internet, the frequency, the quantity and the extent of the communications, whether the audience had the means to act on the incitement, whether the statement (or work) is circulated in a restricted environment or widely accessible to the general public; and

6- **Likelihood, including imminence**: Incitement, by definition, is an inchoate crime. The action advocated through incitement speech does not have to be committed for said speech to amount to a crime. Nevertheless, some degree of risk of harm must be identified. It means that the courts will have to determine that there was a reasonable probability that the speech would succeed in inciting actual action against the target group, recognizing that such causation should be rather direct.

The Rabat Plan notes with concern that perpetrators of incidents, which indeed reach the threshold of article 20 of the ICCPR, are not prosecuted and punished. At the same time, members of minorities are de facto persecuted, with a chilling effect on others, through the abuse of vague domestic legislation, jurisprudence and policies. Political and religious leaders should refrain from using any incitement to hatred, but they also have a crucial role to play in speaking out firmly and promptly against hate speech and should make clear that violence can never be tolerated as a response to incitement to hatred (see also the 18 commitments on “Faith for Rights”).

References:


[21] Lorenzi-Bailly, N., & Guellouz, M. (2019). Homophobie et discours de haine dissimulée sur Twitter : celui qui voulait une poupée pour Noël [Homophobia and Hate Speech Covered on Twitter: Whoever Wanted a Doll for Christmas]. Semen, 47. DOI: 0.4000/semen.12344


[48] Teboune, A. [Algerian Presidency]. (2020a, October 12). الشعب باستفتاء إلا المنطقة الصحراوية قضية حل لا محاولة. [There is no solution to the Western Sahara issue except through the Sahrawi
people's referendum] [Video file]. Retrieved from facebook.com/AlgerianPresidency/videos/708291813112694


[84] Hadžialić, S. (2019). *Chomsky’s just three out of ten strategies of manipulation To understand it, within the Balkans, means to become media literate*. International Conference - Summer Scientific Session “Industry 4.0 and the Balkans” Faculty of Law, Varna Free University. retrieved from