

**Economic Diplomacy and Economic Intelligence Amalgamation:
The Moroccan-Nigerian Economic Exchange as a Case Study
LAMSIAH, A.¹ & BENTALHA, B.²**

1. Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University USMBA, Fez, Morocco, lamsiahmajid03@gmail.com

2. Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah University USMBA, Fez, Morocco, bentalhabadr@gmail.com

Submission date: 15/08/2022

Acceptance date: 24/10/2022

Abstract:

Today, the need to reformulate and strengthen the national interest is all and last a complex process that incorporates political and socioeconomic challenges. By renewing his economic thinking and aiming at the consolidation of a strong foreign policy, King Mohammed VI seized the enormity of the moment and had a SAY in implementing new forms of the Moroccan economic statecraft.

Accelerating maneuverability on a bilateral scale, the pliability of economic tools was among the fundamental foundations of Moroccan economic diplomacy to advance the country's strategic goals. On December 3rd, 2016, the Governments of Morocco and Nigeria signed a bilateral investment treaty. Is Morocco mixing its diplomatic discourse with economic intelligence in forging strong links with Nigeria? Is economic intelligence a diplomatic booster or a pure strategic choice?

The scenario approach adopted reflected systematic research evidence and a rigorous potential. It has been concluded that Moroccan economic diplomacy was meticulously plotted in handling regional and transnational issues. In addition, economic intelligence has turned out to be the milestone of the Moroccan economic diplomacy. This was demonstrated through two issues: the Algerian gas pipeline incident, and the agreement between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the Moroccan National Office of Hydrocarbons and Mines.

Key words: Economic diplomacy, economic intelligence, Moroccan diplomacy, scenario, prospective approach.

Liaisons entre la diplomatie économique et l'intelligence économique :

Cas de l'échange économique Maroc-Nigéria

Résumé :

Aujourd'hui, la nécessité de reformuler et de renforcer l'intérêt national est un processus complexe qui intègre des défis politiques et socio-économiques. En renouvelant sa pensée économique et en visant la consolidation d'une politique étrangère forte, le Roi Mohammed VI a saisi l'énormité du moment et a eu un rôle à jouer dans la mise en œuvre de nouvelles formes de l'artère économique marocaine.

Accélération la manœuvrabilité à l'échelle bilatérale, la flexibilité des outils économiques figurait parmi les bases fondamentales de la diplomatie économique marocaine pour faire avancer les objectifs stratégiques du pays. Le 3 décembre 2016, les gouvernements du Maroc et du Nigeria ont signé un traité bilatéral d'investissement. Le Maroc mélange-t-il son discours diplomatique avec l'intelligence économique pour tisser des liens forts avec le Nigeria ? L'intelligence économique est-elle un catalyseur diplomatique ou un pur choix stratégique ?

L'approche basée sur les scénarii adoptés a montré sa robustesse dans les recherches systématiques et un potentiel rigoureux, et il a été conclu que la diplomatie économique marocaine a été méticuleusement tracée dans le traitement des questions régionales et transnationales. En outre, l'intelligence économique a toujours été le pilier du plan de la diplomatie économique marocaine, sauvant deux aspects importants. Il s'agit, d'une part, du dossier du gazoduc algérien et, d'autre part, de l'accord entre la Nigérien National Petroleum Corporation et l'Office national des hydrocarbures et des mines du Maroc.

Mots-clés : Diplomatie économique, intelligence économique, diplomatie marocaine, scénario, approche prospective.

Introduction:

States have no choice other than acting within a certain but defined framework of balance (True et al., 2019), namely the international system, which buttresses not only the national interest but power as well. The variable of power is indeed the pivotal apparatus that enables the state to bring about its goals and soon afterwards guarantee its national interest. Realists put focus on that the concept that differentiates states is one of capability (Burchill et al., 2001).

Nowadays, the need for boosting the national interest has become the be-all and end-all of states' care (Finnemore, 1996). The kingdom of Morocco, under the reign of King Mohammed VI, has innovated its economic thinking (Nakamura, 2018), striving to establish a positive image as a foreign policy strategy, shifting from a certain form of discourse characterized by the soundness and power of its words to dynamic practical tools. It is actually axiomatic that the Moroccan system of governance should be in shape so that the country can have the stamina to market its interests overseas. Keeping sight of 'the sensitivity of context' (Naguib, 2019), the Moroccan economic performance has been satisfactory and thus automatically paved the ground for stability. Notably, Morocco was able to overcome all the regional political and economic turmoil due to a pragmatic philosophy joining diplomatic skills (economic diplomacy) to economic tools (economic intelligence). Such a smart combination is going to be demonstrated via the Moroccan-Nigerian economic exchange of oil. On December 3rd, 2016, the Moroccan and Nigerian governments signed a bilateral investment treaty, which might have held a particular significance for transition and the implications it could trigger. The visit paid to the Nigerian capital Abuja by King Mohammed VI set, in more concrete terms, new normative fundamentals to reshape the dynamics of the Moroccan official foreign policy.

Accelerating manoeuvrability on a bilateral scale, the pliability of economic tools was among the fundamental foundations of Moroccan economic diplomacy to advance the country's strategic goals. The problematic in this particular instance lies in the multidimensional strategic choice made by Morocco when approaching a country like Nigeria. Benefiting from a ferocious regional competitiveness, is Morocco mixing its diplomatic discourse with economic intelligence in forging strong links with Nigeria? Does the promotion of the national interest lie under the jurisdiction of economic diplomacy or is the national interest boosted with the assistance of economic intelligence? Is economic intelligence a diplomatic booster or a pure strategic choice?

The Scenario analysis approach adopted in this article stems from the tremendous ability of forecasting that characterized King Mohammed VI thinking process through different situations and critical changes. The scenario analysis covered three intervals whereby we demonstrated how the Moroccan institutional logic adapted itself to the indicators of prominent changes that have occurred since 1999. The outcome of the analysis through the scenario approach brought about that King Mohammed VI employed three scenarios (99/2011: National interest and good governance; 2011/2016: National power and the diplomacy of fraternity; 2016/now: Diplomacy of interests).

2. Moroccan Economic Diplomacy

To talk about Moroccan economic diplomacy is in fact tackling all the strategies used by the Moroccan Monarchs through various contemporary situations and induced critical changes, thus understanding the features of the established monarchical policies that offer a sophisticated insight into the mechanisms utilized in the formulation, and the reformulation, of the Moroccan national interest.

1.1 Diplomacy of Image vs. Diplomacy of Fraternity

Morocco has always played the role of a mediator between East and West due to its perfect geographical position and historical stamina (Burke, 1969). King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI have always been able to act as gatekeepers underpinning a strong national identity that transcended traditional boundaries. As gap minimizers and power maximizers, both Kings had recourse to two different variables within which they successfully interacted with other political entities.

As a matter of fact, King Hassan II fit perfectly in the rationale of Nye's definition of soft power as to be able to achieve goals through attraction (Gomichon, 2013; Wüst & Nicolai, 2022). King Hassan II's strategy revolved around establishing himself as an emblem of Moroccan national identity and a catalyst modern leader: diplomacy of image (Lamsiah, 2021). In his attempt to set up reforms that might empower Morocco to move towards a more modern and democratic state, King Hassan II's ultimate parameter was to project, domestically and abroad, a positive monarch's image. King Hassan II was conscious of the image projection's impact especially when the discursive impact fits more or less the rudimentary beliefs, values, and concepts of the targeted audience. The communicative processes employed by King Hassan II, thuswise, aimed basically at influencing not only foreign political discourses but international civil society as well. His inspiration for governing western concepts made him more responsive to broadening the pace for civil society organisations to operate and strengthening the modern aspect of a nation that praises associational pluralism¹.

Morocco knew a happy chapter with the one-size-fits-all approach subtly tailored by King Hassan II. The complexity and dynamism of such an approach lay in the awareness to establish a self-image, a decisive tool to shape national identity, which maintained the aspirations of the national interest. The outstanding key element of the King's strategic communication process, namely his narrative, was that it brilliantly took into consideration the targeted audience's particularities of rationale, history, culture, and even psychology. He frequently tied numerous discursive techniques together to lock his interlocutors into a network of reciprocally irrevocable allegiance. As a discourse shaper- a brand attribute-, King Hassan II anticipated with his proactive insight that the scope of both multilateralism and global governance impact exceeded traditional boundaries in solving intricate international issues (Lamsiah, 2021).

To get deeply engaged in the analysis of King Hassan II conscious use of image, it is very important to draw attention to the consistent but vigorous construction of an identity featured by a certain

¹ The adoption of a new constitution in 1992 involved an inherent global standard of modernism, democracy, and consensus, aiming at setting a culture characterized by a more responsive positioning vis-a-vis the ruled.

singularity that generated a unique individuality. King Hassan II was an emblem of the incarnation of a magic identity that potentially and surely translated a long-existing monarchical background.

King Hassan II's *modus operandi* was to accentuate the modality of a respectful image amid a welter of competing images was to stress three apparent patterns of identities:

- **Cultural identity:** King Hassan II's self-conception and self-awareness of his social existence via the variables of culture and history bestowed him with a relevant categorization easily spotted by the perceiver.
- **Personal identity:** refers to "*self-categories which define the individual as a unique person in terms of their individual differences from other (ingroup) persons*" (Turner et al., 1994). On account of such a definition, the singularity that generates a certain unique individuality fits King Hassan II perfectly since the interaction with foreign media brought into play a charismatic personality.¹
- **Ego identity:** King Hassan II's ego identity was drafted constantly across his lifelong process. The social environment undoubtedly plays a critical part in shaping the perception of ego identity, forging its dimensions and the quality of its recognition (Maree, 2021). With this perspective in mind, King Hassan II established a solid ego with observable implications and manifestations via his personality, behaviour, and, mostly, dialogue-based skills for the sake of a constructive co-existence with the other and in the interest of all.

In a more accountable manner, the close link between image projection, staffed with the three identity types, and Moroccan diplomacy was substantiated by means of the King's iterative debates on the performance and effectiveness of Moroccan diplomacy. Hassan II's image diplomacy successfully engaged in building bridges with a broader international society. The King's political awareness and diplomatic tactfulness set the context in the management of international relations and demonstrated the King's tremendous ability to adapt and contain the contrary discourse, an aggressive discourse translating different cultural, social, and religious backgrounds.

King Mohammed VI injected a fresh impetus into an approach conducive to peaceful development and harmonious co-existence in regional as well as inter-regional relations. The belief that King Mohammed VI has reshaped the nuts-and-bolts of the Moroccan official discourse to emphatically prioritize the relations with African countries was initiated through the 28th summit of the African Union- January 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The summit stood as the perfect framework to understand the significance of the abovementioned diplomatic approach employed by King Mohammed VI. He forthrightly laid down the strategic partnership between Morocco and African countries through a fraternity discourse employed in the summit, translated in key words such as "*home*" expressed differently in French (*où l'on rentre chez soi/ le foyer/ ma maison/ chez moi*), and "*brothers*" (*frères*) used four times.²

¹ To be on the air answering questions of cunning journalists and curious investigations of the public was a bold endeavor of King Hassan II purposely and strategically targeted toward establishing an image of power and prestige in the minds of the viewers.

² France 24 . "DISCOURS - Afrique: Mohammed VI, Roi Du Maroc." *YouTube*, speech of King Mohammed VI, 7 Feb. 2017, [youtube.com/watch?v=H5DW315nW9w](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5DW315nW9w)

Departing from past, somehow, negative standpoints, a positive pluralistic perspective was embraced by the Moroccan institutional logic towards African countries. King Mohammed VI placed his diplomacy in conjunction with fraternity bonds on a south-south level (Rigney, 2018). This step was instrumentally paramount in the era of a new world order emergence and added a strong symbolic flavour to the Moroccan strategic perception of the major world powers' viewpoint about African countries. In this respect, the fraternity and belonging discourse that King Mohammed VI utilized aimed at fine-tuning certain awareness of not only contextually specific issues of territorial contentions and ideological onuses but also historically relevant traditional friendships and deep ties. These ties that King Mohammed VI qualified as *"so powerful in terms of security and peace"* (Maree, 2021) stressed the kingdom's higher status in striving for a peaceful development process giving full play to tactical alliances and interactive co-operations rather than power politics and military coalitions.

As a matter of fact, the diplomatic discourse implemented by King Mohammed VI has been incessantly taking shape through multiple *"projects to improve agricultural productivity and promote food security and rural development of fertilizer production units"* (Maree, 2021). In the midst of talking about 'agricultural' agreements, does economic diplomacy have anything to do with such projects and then be the effective lever for the diplomacy of fraternity? Or is it just a tool used for the sake of shouldering the targeted discourse?

1.2 National Interest and Good Governance

After the death of King Hassan II, King Mohammed VI has taken it upon himself to identify Morocco's national power and national interest through modifying political-administrative apparatuses and public policies. Under numerous experts' interpretations, through myriad political impressions, and within growing visible indicators, the new King Mohammed VI's economic and diplomatic thinking has changed, establishing a moving out of a certain form of discourse characterised by the soundness and power of its words to dynamic practical tools (Lamsiah et al., 2021). It is actually axiomatic that the system of governance should be in shape so that any given country can have the stamina to market its interests overseas (Bârgăoanu & Cheregi, 2021; Berridge, 2021; Constantinou et al., 2021). Max Weber is actually very useful in this context since he stated once that any system of governance, used interchangeably with 'rule', could miss the point if the citizens do not believe in its legitimacy (Kļaviņš, 2021; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020). Keeping sight of 'the sensitivity of context', (Naguib, 2019)¹ nobody could claim that monarchical legitimacy in Morocco has not assured continuity through decades. It is true that King Hassan II faced multitudinous challenges to lay down a political legitimacy during the 60s and the beginning of 70s; nonetheless, things gradually shifted and his political legitimacy reached consensus after the Green March. The very notion of legitimacy is closely related to performance and stability, and one cannot stand without the other; legitimacy is more powerful when stability is backed up by performance. The power of legitimacy is indeed more accepted by the ruled and automatically paves the ground for stability. Notably, Morocco was able to overcome the Arab Spring uprising in 2011 whose leading function was to eradicate entrenched authoritarian

¹ Thyen and Gerschewski stated that "we need to be context sensitive" when dealing with the concept of legitimacy

regimes and boost social mobilization (Zardo & Cavatorta, 2019; Booley, 2021; Becheikh, 2021). The legitimacy crisis was not thinkable in the Moroccan case due to the authenticity of the monarchical legitimacy historically bound up with religious faith and nationalism (God, the nation, the king). The National Initiative for Human Development in 2005 was the first coup de grace of a leader who tried to root out the concept of statism (Hirst, 2013) and cement a fruitful social orientation.

Good governance is therefore a pivotal practice to the country's economic prosperity. For its far-reaching but conclusive political outcome, the constitution reform in 2011 came to secure a new pragmatic philosophy of good governance. Not least important is that a great part of Mohammed VI's concern during the three years prior to the new constitution reform stressed administration and finance as an attempt to work towards standards of quality, transparency, accountability, and responsibility. King Mohammed VI's initiative has been, to all appearances, targeted to resolutely cultivate morality in political conditionality in so far as his belief lies in that any "economic reform will be wasted if the political context is not favourable" (Malinda, 2016). A good governance agenda indeed prioritizes anything but empowering tools for effectively sustaining the country, first, to lay sober political foundations and, second, achieve solid economic development mainly through curbing high-handed mores and selfish state officials who act "*without fear of being called to account*" (Naguib, 2019).

Needless to mention that, in the Moroccan case, the monarchs have always had the upper hand on designing the major guidelines of national interest and foreign policy. It is a tradition which constitutes the backbone of the governing system in the Moroccan Kingdom, and whereby King Mohammed VI has indeed designed the features of diplomatic and eco-political discourses for the sake of a prolific triumphalism. As a point of interest, the centrality of King Mohammed VI's manipulation of the economic tool is driven by a genuine aspiration towards setting up *hegemonic* Morocco, notably through opening markets for Moroccan goods and services as well as boosting internal and external state-sovereignty's "*security and stability*".¹ The (re)formulation of the national interest reflects King Mohammed VI's *offensive motivation* (Mearsheimer, 2001) that carries out the when, why, and how variables regarding a goal-oriented and intentional behaviour fostering Moroccan visibility and influence within the framework of multilateralism.

1.3 Exploring the Concept of Interests in Moroccan Economic Diplomacy

The tremendous impact of the concept of interests is prevailing in the making and implementation of Morocco's economic and diplomatic strategies. King Mohammed VI's diplomatic logic revolves around a branding of Morocco as an economically strong ally by stressing positive conceptions like 'friendliness' and 'geo-political positioning'; it is obvious that the King, since his succession to the throne, has been engaged in promoting the fulfillment of the national interest goal. Awareness and

¹ Edward Hallett Carr believes that military power is important, but equally highlights the preeminent role that economic power can play in backing up military power and then establish security and stability. Such a realistic view of power made a smart forward motion in stressing the broadening of the pace of economy as a powerful tool whereby states can strongly position themselves in the international system.

attitude change are stimulated to structure institutional systems with the intention to attract high-scale investment on the Moroccan territory and, on another level, grasp interest opportunities under the umbrella of economic foreign policy.

The strategic process of foreign policy shaped by the Monarch has always rigorously preserved institutional power that manifests itself in the dominant conviction that Morocco is the perfect place for investment, thus mitigating the handicap of the low profile of socio-economic infrastructure on domestic economy. The association of investment in Morocco with the real status of the domestic economy necessitates the recognition of numerous factors that lead to the somehow blurred image of the country, and to seriously reconsider them in order to stand ready to successfully exploit the challenge of the win-win situational context. Strengthening the Moroccan economic system, King Mohammed VI entrenched a new pragmatic entrepreneurial style in foreign policy and that by enabling the private sector to enjoy an integral part in the statecraft economic strategy. For the given context, several Moroccan companies, such as Royal Air Maroc, Maroc Télécom, ONA, Addoha, ONEP, Attijariwafa bank, BMCE, Managem, etc., were present among the King's staff in his diplomatic mission in Africa.

2. Information, Economic Intelligence: Concepts, Analysis Methods and Information Tools

2.1. Information and Economic Intelligence (EI)

Our current context is featured by the complexity and multiplicity of risks. The crisis has become cyclical. Profound changes have affected the economy, particularly with the acceleration of the globalization process, the constancy of technological development, and the emergence of the information society (Lomas, 2021; Hourenatou, 2020). These different changes require adaptation and continuous improvement of anticipation capacities. Thus, and with these different changes, economic intelligence is a tool to help decision makers in preventing risks, seizing opportunities, and anticipating transformations.

Wilensky (1967) defined business intelligence as the activity of producing knowledge to achieve strategic goals for the good of the organization from a legal context. Martre et al (1994) define it as: *"... the set of coordinated actions of research, processing, and distribution in view of its exploitation, of information useful to economic actors. These various actions are carried out legally with all the guarantees of protection necessary for the preservation of the company's assets, under the best conditions of quality, deadlines and costs"*. The very notion of economic intelligence was as well determined by Bournois & Romani (2000) as an organized approach, at the service of the company's strategic management, aiming to improve its competitiveness via collecting, processing information, and disseminating knowledge useful for mastering its environment (threats and opportunities); this decision-making process uses specific tools, mobilizes employees, and relies on the animation of internal and external networks. *"Economic intelligence is made up of all the concepts, tools, methodologies and practices that enable the relevant linking of different knowledge and information with a view to controlling and developing economic dynamics"* (Amos, 2007).

Most definitions converge globally towards considering economic intelligence as a legal, organized and dynamic process of collecting, processing, disseminating, interpreting and managing useful information with the aim of enlightening decision making in a risky and uncertain environment. For Hamidou & Grari (2018), business intelligence is a trilogy of three functions: intelligence, information protection, and influence. It allows the detection of new opportunities through several types of actions: The watch makes it possible to collect information with anticipatory character, and the capacity of influence aims at communicating the information in order to protrude out its impact on their markets (lobbying and the protection of information make it possible to protect itself in front of the risks and threats).

Economic intelligence is a discipline based mainly on information that fits a given situation. It transversally covers a large majority of our societal activities. It is a central element of the economic intelligence approach and a decisive factor of competitiveness, competitive advantage, and innovation (Turner et al., 1994; Achchab & Harrizi, 2013). The information sources of economic intelligence are classified into three types white, gray, and black (Bobot, 2011). White information is public and accessible; gray information is called sensitive because it is not available, and black information is secret and confidential. Harbulot (1999) conceives economic intelligence as being the systematic research and interpretation of information accessible to all, in the attempt to decipher the intentions of the actors and to know their capacities. It includes all operations of surveillance of the competitive environment (protection, watch, influence). For Leveugle & Sautreau (2008), monitoring consists of staying on the lookout for any useful information. It is about detecting opportunities and the best ways to exploit them, anticipating and analyzing potential risks, protecting information, building scenarios, and understanding the capabilities of actors.

There are four main conceptual currents of economic intelligence (Bulinge & Moinet, 2013): war, security, competitiveness, and economic diplomacy (Table 1).

- **Economic warfare:** expresses conflict and economic violence. It is similar to state intelligence.
- **Economic security:** is characterized by a global approach of awareness, and by a central mission of fighting against interference and organized crime.
- **Economic competitiveness:** is a notion that applies indifferently to companies, territories, or States. Economic competitiveness is "*an organized approach, at the service of the company's strategic management, aiming to improve its competitiveness through the collection, processing of information and dissemination of knowledge useful to the control of its environment (threats and opportunities)*" (Bournois & Romani, 2000). The values that refer to this paradigm are essentially based on the notions of performance, innovation, efficiency, but also, to a lesser extent and subject to inventory, ethics and social responsibility and sustainable development.
- **Economic diplomacy:** is "*a set of activities aimed at the methods and processes of international decision-making and related to cross-border economic activities in the real world. [...] Its field of action is trade, investment, international markets, migration, aid, economic security and the institutions that shape the international environment, and its instruments are relations, negotiation, and influence*" (Revel, 2011). It "*contributes to the concerted construction of a*

harmonious strategic environment, a source of different wealth, whose challenge is the return to a form of balance" (Bulinge, 2013).

Table 1: The Four Branches of Economic Intelligence

	Economic warfare	Economic security	Economic competitiveness	Economic diplomacy
Objective	Geopolitical power will	Defense of national interests	Neoliberalism and controlled globalization	CSR & Sustainable Development
Level	Interstate	Inter-state	Public/private	Trans-state
Principle	War by other means	Defense as a strategy	Competitiveness as a rule	Reason as language
Level of conflict	Conflictuality assumed	Conflictuality undergone	Conflictuality not assumed	Negotiated Conflict

Source: Adapted from Bulinge & Moinet, 2013, p. 62

The notion of economic intelligence implies the surpassing of partial actions designated by the terms of documentation, watch, protection of the competitive patrimony and influence (Martre et al., 1994). Deemed indispensable by its advocates, economic intelligence has been elevated to the rank of public policy and is developing, slowly but surely, within companies. Despite being the subject of multidisciplinary research, economic intelligence can be considered as a dynamic in search of its operational concepts, requiring a strong theoretical foundation (Moinet & Bulinge, 2013). The question of the role of the State is raised; the state's role, which has the capacity to collect and analyze information, in addition to that of firms, is threefold. It actually organizes the management of economic information to help firms engaged in international competition and subject to foreign competition in their own domestic market. The aim is to increase their analytical potential through the wide dissemination of sophisticated information and thus enable them to adjust their strategies to these new competitive threats. Moreover, it ensures the protection of the economic and technological heritage, companies located on strategic niches for the national economy in particular. Finally, the state's role mobilizes the information resources of the administration in order to be able to define a global strategic vision as well as a hierarchy of priorities and axes of intervention by geographical zones (Martre et al., 1994).

The economic intelligence deployed at the state level is characterized by an "intelligence cycle" completed when it meets the objectives, and then it is followed by a new cycle with a full rupture with the previous one (Hakmaoui & Berrada, 2020). Nevertheless, the information cycle, even essential, is not sufficient to define the functional essence of an EI system for an organization. The national economic intelligence system, such as *"the combination of practices and know-how of production and interpretation of knowledge, developed on a national scale between different institutions"* (Knauf, 2010), is distinguished by the ability to produce knowledge useful for decision-making and adapted to the requirements of international competition as well as the implementation of actions to influence and promote national economic and political models. Thus, the insertion of economic diplomacy in the overall framework of the national economic intelligence system allows to strengthen it on the one hand and to consolidate economic diplomacy as an instrument of influence on the other hand (Dafir, 2014).

The question of ethics and deontology is not marginal in economic intelligence; it is rather primordial as much for the company and practitioners as for the notoriety of the profession. Economic intelligence is a completely legal step, not to be confused with espionage. Economic intelligence is indeed a global approach that concerns the company as well as the economic actors and the communities. The success of the economic intelligence process is subordinated to the coordination between the various stages. From then on, the strategic management of economic information becomes a fully-fledged tool for the permanent understanding of the reality of markets, techniques, and ways of thinking of competitors, their culture, their intentions, and their ability to implement them. This approach is at the heart of national economic intelligence systems, which now appear as essential levers for competition and employment.

2.2. The challenges of EI for Morocco and Moroccan Diplomacy

Morocco has long been committed to a policy of openness with respect to the opportunities offered by globalization. It is a deliberate choice in terms of very varied sectorial strategies in order to shine on the African continent and in the world (Redouaby & Lafrem, 2020). *"Today, the mastery of this new intangible black gold that is information, forces Companies, see the States themselves, to integrate and master this new resource that is economic information, and this, for essentially strategic uses"* (Jeanne-Beylot et al., 2017). This project of influence requires Morocco to put in place monitoring devices to provide relevant information, to be attentive to business opportunities, to scrutinize competition and to counter threats (Kaya & Messaoudi, 2016).

From a theoretical point of view, a more active insertion to the different circuits of the global economy is supposed to generate many positive effects. It is a way to improve the allocation of resources by concentrating them on activities where the country has a comparative advantage, but also to increase efficiency through increased competition, and finally to promote technology transfer (Dafir & Haoudi, 2014). Information is the new strength of nations. Nevertheless, there are a number of challenges to be met in developing the information market in all its dimensions.

The steering of economic intelligence requires institutions capable of permanently monitoring the indicators and of setting up homogeneous information management and protection systems. It is also a strategic issue as the development strategy will allow us to identify the decisional problems and determine the real informational needs. The implementation of a business intelligence system will result from the integration of this system in the strategic development orientations. Legal gaps can create situations of inertia and misunderstanding and might be responsible for the loss of information or the delay of decision making. Moreover, a managerial and organizational issue, materialized by the capacity of the concerned actors, operates by using managerial tools in order to set up the EI system. A rigorously thought-out system will allow organizations to acquire knowledge in a suitable manner (Delbecque & Fayol, 2018). Finally, there is a cultural issue inherent in the implementation of an EI system which requires awareness and the development of an information sharing culture. These actions necessitate great efforts, especially in terms of integrating EI mechanisms into educational programs and national awareness.

3. Research Methodology: Scenario Analysis

Scenario analysis is not intended to provide forecasts, but rather to improve current decisions on the basis of a better appreciation of the range of potential circumstances (Bentalha et al., 2019). It aims to provide a representation of an initial situation and a description of the driving forces and key changes that lead to a particular future state (Alcamo & Henrichs, 2008). Scenario analysis originated in military planning in the aftermath of World War II (Fuller-Love et al., 2006). Used as a tool to forecast future alternatives, scenario analysis has helped a number of companies gain competitive advantage (Millett, 2003). It has emerged as a response to the poor performance of traditional forecasting methods (Bentalha et al., 2021). Especially when structural changes take place and surprise or unexpected events may alter the fundamental assumptions underlying these forecasts, rendering them inaccurate.

Kahn (1962) defined a scenario as a *“quantitative or qualitative picture of a given organization or group, developed within the framework of a set of specified assumptions”*. Their purpose can also be to generate fresh perceptions: *“scenarios can effectively organize a variety of seemingly unrelated economic, technological, competitive, political and societal information and translate it into a framework for judgment – in a way that no model can do”*. Godet & Roubelat (1996) define a scenario as *“a description of a future situation and the course of events which allows one to move forward from the original situation to the future situation.”* Van der Heijden (2000) describes scenarios as *“tools to research one’s understanding of the world.”* In line with the critical realism paradigm the objective is to challenge one’s own ‘mental model’ of the future.

Godet (2000) & van Veen-Croot et al. (2000) two types of scenarios: Exploratory and normative/predictive scenarios. Exploratory scenarios are mainly based on historical descriptions extrapolated by current trends, and thus decide which scenarios are likely to occur to finally go on depicting the various future consequences. Such exploratory scenarios are used to elicit ideas about possible futures and to investigate what may occur. The beginning point for normative or anticipatory scenarios is the desired future condition, and these sorts of scenarios investigate how a certain aim may be met, after which targets are defined and pathways to the stated future are detailed. Normative and descriptive situations are distinguished by Notten et al. (2003). Suggested situations (also referred to as prospective (Alla et al., 2022), strategy, policy or intervention scenarios).

Various writers argue that scenario analysis may be used for a variety of purposes. Rienstra et al. provided the functionalities listed below (1996). The e-scenarios signaling function provide more insight into unclear circumstances. E-scenarios' communication and learning functions encourage people to consider alternate futures. The exploring and explaining the function of e-scenarios demonstrate how, given particular policy goals, solutions to specific issues may become a reality; they also provide various solution methodologies. The e-scenarios' demonstration tool shows the outcomes of particular selections via what is labeled as the decision-making assistance feature (Allwood et al., 2008). In contrast, the following steps are used (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Procedure of the Scenario Analysis Adopted



Source: Personal elaboration

Understanding the ramifications of each scenario allows for in-depth understanding of future uncertainty. While any number of future scenarios may be created, the beauty of scenario-building lies in the careful balance of creativity and procedure used to select the stories that shed light on the topic at hand (Duinker & Greig, 2007).

The choice of the scenario approach didn't come from a vacuum, but to adequately cover the strategic choices undertaken by the Moroccan institutional logic when managing regional economic issues. The analysis is going to start by defining the topic and the relevance of the scenario perspective, and then it moves to state the economic ambiguities that have marked the national and regional arena since 1999. In this sense, before we display the dynamics of the two scenarios, the presentation of two axes proves to be major to understand the scenario analysis background.

4. Results and Discussions

4.1. Define the Topic/Problem and the Focus on the Scenario Analysis

Morocco, as a seeking power country, has no choice other than acting within a clear-cut framework advocating the consolidation of national power. It is important that Morocco was able to rise about, on one hand, the critical political transition after the death of King Hassan II in 1999, and, on the other hand, the regional political and economic turmoil in 2011. So far, Morocco started to enjoy an increasingly higher political status and economic influence in regional affairs. King Mohammed VI actually relies on a pragmatic philosophy joining diplomatic skills, i.e. economic diplomacy to economic tools embodied in the economic intelligence. Such a combination has strengthened the construction of a win-win interstate partnership with African countries (Messari, 2018; Teevan, 2019). A new pattern of African cooperation boosted bilateral and multilateral diplomatic practices with the focus on recovering strong links with African neighbours on both sides of the continent: The Francophone and the Anglophone.

Our concern in this case in point resides within the multidimensional strategic choice made by Morocco when approaching an English-speaking country: Nigeria. The economic diplomacy applied by the Kingdom has been consistently taking shape in the time of ferocious regional competitiveness

through prioritizing the creation of a harmonious co-existence environment. Significantly, the primacy of economic security contributed to the consolidation of the strategic choice embodied in south-south, win-win relations, and thus enhanced the state's image. The conceivable complementarity between economic diplomacy and economic intelligence fundamentally begun by strengthening the monarchy's alliance with traditional African friends, i.e., French speaking countries, and then building a forward-looking approach by forging strong links with English speaking African countries.

The scenario approach is used to interpret and elaborate the possible strategic choices Morocco has to make when handling regional economic issues. The two time periods we drew should be contextualized within national and regional changes; Morocco has consciously worked on National interest and good governance in the first axis from 1999 to 2011 while the second segment focused on national power and the diplomacy of fraternity. The growing visibility of the Moroccan diplomatic discourse in Africa has put the spotlight on the economic intelligence as an essential mechanism towards implementing Moroccan national power. Two suggested scenarios might be useful to understand the functionality of the economic intelligence employed by Morocco in the diplomatic process.

4.2. The key Factors Leading to the Scenario Analysis and Identifying Critical uncertainties

4.2.1. Axis 1: National Interest and Good Governance (1999/2011)

July 1999 was of particular significance for transition in The Moroccan arena and all the implications this transition might have triggered. Obviously, King Mohammed VI benefited from the support and advocacy of the Moroccan society's diverse spectrum for building strong competitive institutions and establishing a comprehensive reform plan. Carrying out all expectations in the very particular Moroccan social and political context was of great importance. The decision to move ahead was very critical and raised numerous questions, especially due to the huge legacy left by King Hassan II: full-blown polyvalence, high-toned presence, unexcelled charisma and a vision of a seer. The exigency to act quickly and think big was at the top of King Mohammed's priority agenda.

King Mohammed VI was born on 21st August 1963 and ascended the throne on 23rd July 1999. On a governmental level, the outstanding feature that characterizes King Mohammed VI's ruling style has been the implementation of a new perspective of *realpolitik*: I don't promise to succeed, but I promise to try (Akalay, 2019). For that, he opted for the revitalization of democratic political life, a better national reconciliation embodied in the release of detainees, and the experience of (rotation) through the formation of the last government headed by Abderrahman Youssoufi. These radical political reforms contributed meaningfully in plummeting economic and social pressure and fostering Morocco's stability. For sure, numerous challenges have been left to face King Mohammed VI among which to develop a positive course for Moroccan-Algerian relations through the settlement of the Sahara issue, and to stand against economic and social plights which became sharper within a new globalized context. Most importantly, King Mohammed VI should look for an effective approach to

adopt vis-à-vis North African and Arab countries, and tracks of interacting with the new international system.

Accordingly, the parliamentary elections in 2002 were a boost and a buttress toward democracy. Moreover, King Mohammed VI set the context for reconciliation with the North (Rif) through visiting its rural area after a long rupture during the reign of his father, King Hassan II, which helped to unfussily reconstruct the ties between the monarchy and the opposition stronghold. On July 1, 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring revolutions, Moroccans were at the rendezvous of a pre-eminent moment featured by the “*comprehensive constitutional reform*” promulgated by the king, and to which they responded with a massive consent. The king thus granted many of his attributions to the Prime Minister and the Parliament without relinquishing his political and religious suzerainty.

The perceptual component of the 99/2011 temporal axis fits perfectly “economic security” (Bulinge & Moinet, 2013) paradigm mainly based on a key referent: a strategic national defensive culture. To a big part, the economic security may be used interchangeably with economic power since they stress the same values such as national interest, territorial potential, agriculture, and industry. The rivalry of economic powers has cleared the way to an urgent economic intelligence as a major instrument in setting up immunity from economic violence. Realists had once asserted that any balance of power cannot be fulfilled if not via the preservation of the status quo which leads to the maintaining of international peace and security (Morgenthau, 1973). With this perspective in mind, the exploratory task led is targeting the major decisions undertaken by the King Mohammed VI in the consolidation of his development model mostly implemented through the incarnation of societal approach: governance.

The set of practices carried out by the governance process between 1999 and 2011 boosted the likelihood of granting a key stimulus to the mediating role of the traditional stream of the main institution for further contributions to civil society actors by means of the modality of participation. The very concept of stability and performance, already mentioned in the theoretical section, afforded solid insight into governance implementation and its smooth practice.

Good governance has been conceived as a tool of dynamic interaction; it has been designed through the management and consideration of political awareness, social justice, and socioeconomic conditions. In the Moroccan context, the strategic decision to issue the National Initiative for Human Development in 2005 was a master stroke to enhance institutional practices for the sake of the country’s economic prosperity. King Mohammed VI was facing challenges at the time in reconstructing hegemonic Morocco in a constantly evolving global sphere of geostrategic rush to gain balance internally and externally. Building on the concept of security, the planning and management of domestic affairs was apparently a pivotal manoeuvre towards demonstrating the effectiveness of multi-level governance that King Mohammed VI established, and thus enhanced the accountability and transparency framework at a functional level locally, nationally, and internationally (table 2).

Indicators of the developing countries profiles rise continuous criticism through accountability and reporting on the deficit in implementing various levels of governance that leads to the failure to

improve trust among both citizens and international observers. In January 2010, King Mohammed VI set up a Consultative Commission on Regionalization, ostensibly to examine how administration, regional development, and finance functioned under these arrangements.

Table 2: National interest and good governance

Era	Transition
Reality	Economic and social pressure (unemployment, poverty, human rights...), the growing frustration vis-à-vis politicians and political practices
Target	National interest, societal stability
Governmental aspiration	Smooth succession, civil reforms, national reconciliation
Popular aspirations	Political revitalization, social equality, socioeconomic growth
Economic vision	Security
Dominant practice	Governance

4.2.2. Axis 2: National Power and Diplomacy of Fraternity (2011/2016)

In the course of and along with traditional files, new issues, such as the Arab Spring, free trade agreements, terrorism, extremism, and immigration, have surprisingly emerged to hamper the efforts of the new king towards laying down effective mechanisms to win the challenges at home and abroad. Strategic direction in foreign policy was made and a “*complex-free*” diplomacy (Amar, 2017) started, in the first place, in the African axis. Some “*949 agreements concluded (during) 46 royal visits to 25 African countries*” (Amar, 2017) emphatically demonstrated the change in pace and content of political awareness, within the framework of a careful response to geopolitical necessities. Such a step of reconciliation has repaired a ‘long lasting’ rupture since Morocco left the Organization of the African Union (OAU) in 1984, in protest against the admission of the Polisario front as the 51st member of the organization. To this end, a fresh impetus was set up by the King Mohammed VI on the conception of ‘us’, and in that respect it brought up a fundamental change in both regional and inter-regional relations; a change featured by the spirit of affiliation and the equality of opportunity.

As a matter of fact, King Mohammed VI placed his diplomacy in conjunction with a departure from past negative standpoints and a shift towards a positive pluralistic perspective, and thus put the focus on south-south fraternity bonds. Revitalizing such bonds was instrumentally paramount in changing the major world powers’ viewpoint about African countries seen as “*states without citizens; states that exist only for themselves and their own beneficiaries, and that exclude the vast majority of the population*” (Malinda, 2016). In this sense, King Mohammed VI’s directed discourse of fraternity aims at fine-tuning certain awareness of not only contextually specific issues of territorial contentions and ideological onuses but also historically relevant traditional friendships and deep ties. These ties that King Mohammed VI qualified as “*so powerful in terms of security and peace*”¹ stress the kingdom’s higher ambition to implement a peaceful development process giving full play to tactical alliances and interactive co-operations rather than power politics and military coalitions. In this vein, the diplomatic discourse implemented by King Mohammed VI has been incessantly taking shape through multiple projects in a variety of fields. The dominant practice of the Moroccan institutional logic in this particular axis was advocating competitiveness in terms of economic, political and diplomatic

¹ France 24. “DISCOURS - Afrique: Mohammed VI, Roi Du Maroc.” *YouTube*, speech of King Mohammed VI, 7 Feb. 2017, [youtube.com/watch?v=H5DW315nW9w](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5DW315nW9w). Accessed in Feb.2018.

outcomes. Shouldering the diplomatic discourse of fraternity with a set of projects was an effective approach to build-up an operative country performance and fruitful policy outputs.

Morocco has been coping with a serious constraint embodied in setting up shared grounds for sustainable growth, which can boost economic competitiveness and ensure social welfare. In the same vein, Morocco's strategy for the 2012-2016 period¹ was outlined to emphasize two fundamental spheres: The first was to bolster governance and social inclusion- this is what was tackled in axis 1; and the second was, most importantly, to enhance productivity within the economy and back up the creation of sustainable "green" infrastructure. Morocco's consciousness decided hugely on the strategic guidelines of maintaining a strong position in the regional growth rod and speeding up the pace of variability of economic rise sources. The reform programs were principally directed to enhancing the effectiveness of the logistics sector, more particularly ports, airports, the roads and highways (Table 3).

Table 3: National Power and Diplomacy of Fraternity

Era	National power
Reality	The fulfillment of economic interest within political conditionality
Target	Openness to change, conflict resolution dynamics
Governmental aspiration	Effective re-integration in and smart capitalization on the African Union (AU) for the sake of the Moroccan Sahara conflict resolution
Popular aspirations	Socioeconomic growth through leadership in South-South cooperation mega projects
Economic vision	Economic intelligence and "a complex-free" diplomacy
Dominant practice	competitiveness

4.3. Scenario logics and Proposed Scenarios

4.3.1. Scenario 1: A Long-Lasting Relationship of Prudence

To set the context of the Moroccan-Algerian relationship is to take into consideration all the strained interactions between the two states over the years. Our contextual prospective scenario will fundamentally cover economic and political facets of the relationship and translate them into a framework of prognosis that will give credit to the possible future state of affairs.

Our most concern is about the shut off of one of the Algerian natural gas pipeline passing through the Moroccan land in 2021. Such energy crisis culminated in a diplomatic rift that exacerbated by accusing Moroccan officials to undertake belligerent actions incorporated in aiding the Nationalist Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie.² The gas weapon Algeria utilized in its aggressive behavior towards Morocco emerged in a sense after, on one hand, the encounter of Moroccan officials with their Israeli counterparts for a probable normalization, especially after the visit of the Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz to Rabat in December 2020. On the other hand, the US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara was of a serious jolt to Algiers which considered this strategic shift in Morocco's choice of allies as a menace to its national security.

With the emergence of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, regional coalitions have revealed to be of urgent necessity and mainly driven by the context of a dubious global arena and poorly tackled

¹ <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/MOROCCO%20-%20CSP%202012-2016.pdf>

² <https://www.voanews.com/a/diplomatic-dispute-between-algeria-and-morocco-prompts-energy-crisis-in-spain/6298213.html>.

bilateral conflicts. Political realism and economic intelligence are meant to be promotional tools to span the bridges of mutual pragmatism. Related hereto is the reaction of both Morocco and Algeria once the conflict burst on 24 February 2022, and the way whereby they will handle the issue regionally and globally. Beyond ideological and strategic ties, the pursuit of power politics and national interest remains a very sensitive character in multinational relations. As a matter of fact, Algeria abstained to vote in the assembly in spite of its traditional alliance of the former USSR. Morocco was absent in the vote although it has always been loyal to the EU and US. The emblematic standpoint evinced vis-à-vis the mentioned above conflict consolidates what realists labeled as rationality and state-centrism (Burchill et al., 2001).

Morocco has always been able to manage regional dynamics, and traditionally been considered as a strong ally. While Algeria is struggling to achieve dominion over everything related to the Moroccan Sahara issue, Morocco mainly hinges on diplomatic practices to generate and manage peaceful ties due to the theory-grounded insights and the great potential of evidence-based economic strategies handled by a number of skilled practitioners. It is noteworthy to highlight the fact that the influence of France on Morocco and Algeria is deeply rooted. It seems unconceivable for France to accept the quarrel of Algeria with Morocco without calculating the probability of jeopardizing the country's economic benefits, especially that new allies are establishing a foothold in the area, namely US and Israel. Aiming to address the situation, France, Spain with a less degree, will try to address the situation by inciting the executives in the Algerian regime to open the gas pipeline passing through the Moroccan land. Such scenario reflects diplomatic and economic realities that encompass the needs of states in the region, which fear to severely meet a hostile big-scale conflict that may affect their status quo power.

The scenario we are adopting relies on the assumption that Algeria sits at an awkward position vis-à-vis the predominance of a genuine political thought process Morocco has established over the years. It is true that economic policy is very important but politicians have always had the upper word, with the blessing of the main institution, since they wield the power of influence, via various available means, on the global battleground. Morocco's attitude is understandable in the regional complex arena, where the connection between politics, economy and history decides on the implementation of the road map of the region.

4.3.2. Scenario 2: Diplomacy of Interests

The chief obligation of Morocco after the second axis (2011/2016) was to grasp the spirit of change and thus combine economy with diplomacy in more complex realities. The management of a suitable setting to fit Moroccan economic ambitiousness was conducted rigorously and mobilized powerful means to insure the outlining of a new foreign economic choice. By reason of consolidating its national power, Morocco accelerated economic manoeuvrability on new bilateral dimensions, setting priority to economic tools to lay down the fundamental foundations of the Moroccan economic diplomacy to advance the state's strategic goals. The end of the year 2016 knew the Moroccan reconsideration and reshaping of the normative momentum of the Monarch's economic diplomacy when approaching African English-speaking countries, namely Nigeria.

When in 2012 the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies stated that Morocco still favored French-speaking African countries since dealing with English-speaking countries mainly South Africa and Nigeria “*requires economic operators of the English language and regulatory frameworks inherited from Anglo-Saxon traditions*”, (IRES, 2012) no one could have imagined that after four years’ time the economic diplomacy apparatus would shift for the African English-speaking camp, capitalizing a Moroccan-Nigerian bilateral investment treaty on 3rd December 2016.

Apart from the technicalities of the trends, expenses and the feasibility of the mega construction project, what we are interested in is the significant implementation of the gas pipeline between two strategic players. The Monarch’s decisiveness to strategically venture into setting up sectorial complementarities with Nigeria has been by far a master stroke. For the given context, Morocco’s Minister of Education, stated once that English could not replace French as a language of instruction for at least another 10 years while during the World Education Forum, held in London on January 21, 2019, the Minister himself discussed the possibility of training Moroccan teachers, especially of scientific disciplines, in the English language with the British Minister of State for the Middle East Alistair Burt (Bazza, 2019). The minister’s double-voicing through an official discourse, was indeed translating an institutional narrative, adopting a domestically normative approach but pragmatically diplomatic, that reflected the pressing standards of a political conditionality that still carries culturally and historically long-standing relations with the French camp. Not being taken in by appearances, the strategic development orientations embraced by Morocco decide on the type of the business intelligence system adopted. The gas pipelines strategically speaking are an emblematic bridge that links gas sufficient countries with the gas-deficient ones enabling them to secure their national interest and power.

Our second scenario looks at the trans-African pipeline project as an appetizer in Morocco’s strategy towards forging strong partnerships with the most influencing African states, stressing fraternity and trust, and promoting complementarity and growth. The emphatic use of economic intelligence translates a smart economic diplomacy given full play by the Monarch to consolidate and boost an image of a hegemonic kingdom that accrued historical prosperity, political stability, and economic strength all over the years. Moroccan economic intelligence has been enriching the construction of a diplomatic discourse that seeks to venture in new areas never ventured onto. The preoccupation with diplomacy in the economic field is likely to be more interesting if the approach of economic intelligence retains a higher degree of maneuverability in countries of great power, namely GB. The readiness and the will to operate beyond the old borders with traditional French-speaking allies invite a variety of opportunities for businessmen, academics, sportsmen, and the public administration itself to exchange expertise with increasingly higher status English-speaking countries, either African or British, and their influence in global affairs. The chart below summarizes the main characteristics and disparities between the two scenarios (Table 4).

Table 4: Proposed Scenarios A Long-Lasting Relationship of Prudence & Diplomacy of Interests

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2
Reference framework	Prudence	National Interest
Economic propensity	Economic security/ strategic interests security	Economic diplomacy/ sustainable development
Strategic drift	Political vigilance / state-centrism	Economic intelligence/new south bilateral connections
Future aspirations	Tactical alliances and interactive co-operations rather than power politics and military coalitions, keeping a high pragmatic profile with France and Spain.	Sustainable opportunities and collaborations with the African English-speaking camp, smooth transition to green economy and comfortable positioning in the course of competitiveness in renewable energy transition and food security.

Conclusion and perspectives:

It is quite telling that the Moroccan economic diplomacy performance has been very gratifying. It implemented a platform for new energy security and sectorial complementarity with new south countries. Notably, Morocco, under the reign of King Mohammed VI, managed to rise above many political and economic problems either nationally or globally, and that due to a pragmatic philosophy mixing diplomacy with economy, namely economic diplomacy and economic intelligence.

The approach of scenarios demonstrated that Morocco brought forth its powerful economic diplomacy, and how it started to play a leading role on regional and trans-regional scales using effective economic intelligence. In fact, the agreement between the Nigerian national petroleum corporation and the Moroccan national board of hydrocarbons and mines in August 2017 was prior to the Algerian natural gas pipeline shut off in 2021 which clearly shows the insightful outlook of the Monarch. The two scenarios shed light on the economic policy package that Morocco possesses and thus uses to promote its economic interests. Investing, cooperating, or positioning itself, Morocco bestows a great deal of respect to turning perceptual thinking into a rational one, and that to empower the advocacy and primacy of the diplomatic practice.

The contribution of our paper is to present a prospective approach of economic intelligence in Morocco. It is an interesting subject and the current geopolitical and economic trends confirm the primordial character of this theme. Nevertheless, our analysis has focused only on two scenarios and the study of the Morocco-Nigeria relationship hides the multidisciplinary nature of international relations marked by the multitude of actors and interests. Thus, we can consider a complementary approach to our work marked by the integration of temporal analysis with the scenarios provided or the involvement of other state and non-state actors in the explanation of the relationship studied.

Bibliography :

- Achchab, B., & Harrizi, D. (2013). Les défis de l'intelligence économique au Maroc. *La Revue Gestion et Organisation*, 5(2), 130-137.
- Akalay A. (2019). "Mohammed VI N'as Pas Trouvé La Formule Magique." *Www.lemonde.fr*, 27 July 2019, www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2019/07/27/mohammed-vi-n-a-pas-trouve-la-formule-magique_5494032_3232.html
- Alcamo, J., & Henrichs, T. (2008). Chapter two towards guidelines for environmental scenario analysis. *Developments in integrated environmental assessment*, 2, 13-35.
- Alla, L., Jaouhari, E., & Bentalha, B. (2022). Repenser l'entrepreneuriat au sein du secteur informel au Maroc à l'ère du post Covid-19: Pour approche prospective de la formalisation intégrative. *Alternatives Managériales et Economiques*, 4(1), 180-202.

- Allwood, J. M., Laursen, S. E., Russell, S. N., de Rodriguez, C. M., & Bocken, N. M. P. (2008). An approach to scenario analysis of the sustainability of an industrial sector applied to clothing and textiles in the UK. *Journal of Cleaner production*, 16(12), 1234-1246.
- Amar A. (2017). "La Diplomatie Décomplexée De Mohammed VI En Afrique." *Le Desk*, 30 Jan. 2017, ledesk.ma/enclair/la-diplomatie-decomplexee-de-mohammed-vi-en-afrique
- Amos D., (2007). « Regard scientifique sur le concept d'intelligence économique », in *La Veille sur l'Internet du libre accès : entre objet scientifique réflexif et management stratégique de l'information économique*, Paris, 2007, pp.1-8
- Bârgăoanu, A., & Cheregi, B. F. (2021). Artificial Intelligence : The New Tool for Cber Diplomacy. In *Artificial Intelligence and Digital Diplomacy* (pp. 115-130). Springer, Cham.
- Bazza T. (2019). "Education Minister Disregards English in Morocco, Not in London." *Casablanca: Morocco World News*. <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/01/264264/education-minister-english-morocco-london>
- Becheikh, N. (2021). Political stability and economic growth in developing economies: Lessons from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt ten years after the Arab Spring. *Insights into Regional Development*, 3(2), 229-251
- Bentalha, B., Hmioui, A., & Alla, L. (2019). The digitalization of the supply chain management of service companies: a prospective approach. In *Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Smart City Applications* (pp. 1-8).
- Bentalha, B., Hmioui, A., & Lhoussaine, A. L. A. (2021). Last mile logistics applied to the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines: A prospection of good practices. *Alternatives Managériales Economiques*, 3(3), 41-61.
- Berridge, G. (2021). *Diplomacy: theory and practice*. Springer Nature.
- Bobot, L. (2011). L'apport de l'intelligence économique en négociation commerciale. *Management Avenir*, (4), 256-272.
- Booley, A. (2021). The effect of the 2011 Arab uprising in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena region): Morocco's quest for constitutional reform and the 20 February Movement. *Law, Democracy and Development*, 25(SPE), 223-241.
- Bournois F. & Romani PJ, (2000). L'intelligence économique et stratégique dans les entreprises françaises, *Economica*.
- Bulinge F., (2013). Intelligence économique : l'information au cœur de l'entreprise, *Nuvis-CIGREF*.
- Bulinge, F. & Moinet, N. (2013). L'intelligence économique : un concept, quatre courants. *Sécurité et stratégie*, 12, 56-64. <https://doi.org/10.3917/sestr.012.0056>
- Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R. A., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., & True, J. (2001). *Theories of International Relations*. (2nd edition ed.) Palgrave Macmillan.
- Burke, E. (1969). Morocco and the Near East: Reflections on some basic differences. *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 10(1), 70-94
- Constantinou, C. M., Dittmer, J., Kuus, M., McConnell, F., Opondo, S. O., & Pouliot, V. (2021). Thinking with Diplomacy: Within and Beyond Practice Theory. *International Political Sociology*, 15(4), 559-587.
- Dafir, A. (2014). Le Maroc face à la crise internationale: contribution de la diplomatie économique. *Revue Internationale de Management et de Stratégie*, (5: 1).
- Dafir, A., & Haoudi, K. (2014). La diplomatie économique et l'insertion internationale de l'économie marocaine/[Economic diplomacy and international integration of the Moroccan economy]. *International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies*, 6(4), 850.
- Delbecque E & Fayol J-R (2018). *Intelligence économique*, VUIBERT, 2e édition, Paris, 2018.
- Duinker, P. N., & Greig, L. A. (2007). Scenario analysis in environmental impact assessment: Improving explorations of the future. *Environmental impact assessment review*, 27(3), 206-219.
- Edward, Hallet Carr. (1964). *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. New York: Harper Torchbook.
- Finnemore, M. (1996). *National interests in international society*. Cornell University Press
- Fuller-Love, N., Midmore, P., Thomas, D., & Henley, A. (2006). Entrepreneurship and rural economic development: a scenario analysis approach. *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research*, 12(5), 289-305. doi:10.1108/13552550610687655
- Godet M, Roubelat F. (1996). Creating the future: the use and misuse of scenarios. *Long Range Planning*;29(2):164e71.
- Godet M. (2000). The art of scenarios and strategic planning: tools and pitfalls. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*; 65(3).
- Gomichon, M. (2013). Joseph Nye on soft power. *E-International relations students*, 8.
- Hakmaoui, A., & Berrada, N. (2020). L'Intelligence économique: levier de développement stratégique à l'international. *Dossier de recherche en économie et gestion*, 9(1), 157-174.
- Hamidou K. et Grari Y., (2018), « l'intelligence économique enjeu majeur pour les PME », *Revue du Contrôle de la Comptabilité et de l'Audit*, n° 6 septembre 2018.
- Harbulot, C. (1999). Intelligence économique et guerre de l'information. *Revue Mars*, troisième trimestre.
- Hirst, P. (2013). *From statism to pluralism: democracy, civil society and global politics*. Routledge
- Hourenatou, H. (2020). La pratique de l'intelligence économique dans les entreprises au Cameroun: Enjeux et perspectives. *Journal of the Cameroon Academy of Sciences*, 15(3), 181-192.
- IRES. (2012). "Les Relations Maroc-Afrique : Les Voies d'une stratégie Globale et Rénovée ." www.ires.ma, Rabat : IRES, 2012, www.ires.ma/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/RAPPORT_AFRIQUE.pdf

- Jeanne-Beylot F., Guerraoui D., et Carpentier JB. (2017). « Actes des Assises Africaines de l'Intelligence Economique », Casablanca.
- Kahn, H. (1962), *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, Avon Books, New York, NY.
- Kaya S-A K. et Messaoudi N., (2016). « Vers un Benchmark de l'intelligence économique des trois pays du Maghreb : Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie », *Revue Economie, Gestion et Société*, no 8, pp.1-21.
- Klaviņš, D. (2021). *Diplomacy and Artificial Intelligence in Global Political Competition*. Global Studies, 213.
- Knauf A. (2010) , *Les dispositifs d'intelligence économique: Compétences et fonctions utiles à leur pilotage- Business intelligence 2010*
- Lamsiah, A., Benabderrazik, Y., & Bentalha, B. (2021). The Economic and political components of diplomatic discourse: State actors in Morocco-UK Free Trade Agreement as a case study. *Alternatives Managériales Economiques*, 3(4), 496-517.
- Lamsiah, A.M (2021). *Moroccan-British diplomacy under the reign of King Mohammed VI : Non-state actors as a case study* [Doctoral dissertation, School of Humanities-Sais, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University]
- Leveugle D. et Sautreau A. L. (2008), *l'intelligence économique et la veille stratégique ou la valeur ajoutée de l'information*, Master 2, ICD-mention GIDE, année universitaire 2007-2008.
- Lomas, D. W. B. (2021). *Diplomacy and intelligence*. *Journal of Intelligence History*, 16(2), 94.
- Malinda S., (2016). *Beyond the African Tragedy: Discourses on Development and the Global Economy*. London: Routledge, 2016,p.132
- Maree, J. G. (2021). The psychosocial development theory of Erik Erikson: critical overview. *Early Child Development and Care*, 191(7-8), 1107-1121.
- Martre, H., Clerc, P., & Harbulot, C. (1994). *Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises*. Rapport du commissariat général au Plan, Paris, La documentation française, 17, 82-94.
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Messari, N. (2018). *Morocco's African foreign policy*. *Future Notes MENARA Project*, 12.
- Millett, S. (2003), "The future of scenarios: challenges and opportunities", *Strategy and Leadership*, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 16-24.
- Moinet, N., & Bulinge, F. (2013). *Intelligence économique: vers une nouvelle dynamique de recherche*. *Revue française des sciences de l'information et de la communication*, (3).
- Morgenthau H.J. (1973). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, p. 167.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2020). The rise and fall of good-governance promotion. *Journal of Democracy*, 31(1), 88-102.
- Naguib R. (2019). "Legitimacy and Transitional Continuity in a Monarchical Regime: Case of Morocco". *International Journal Of Public Administration*, vol 43, no. 5, 2019, pp. 404-424. Informa UK Limited. doi:10.1080/01900692.2019.1672733.
- Nakamura, L. (2018). Creativity and economic growth: theory, measures, and potentials for Morocco. *Journal of Intellectual Capital*.
- Notten PWF, Rotmans J, Van Asselt MBA, Rothmans DS. (2003). An updated scenario typology. *Futures* 2003;35(5).
- Redouaby, M., & Lafrem, M. (2020). *La pratique de l'intelligence économique dans les administrations publiques marocaines*. *Dossiers de Recherches en Economie et Gestion*, 9(1), 73-91.
- Revel, C. (2011). *Diplomatie économique multilatérale et influence*. *Géoeconomie*, (1), 59-67.
- Rienstra SA, Nijkamp P, Smokers RTM, Vleugel JM. (1996). *Scenarios in decision-making*. Petten, ECN-Policy Studies. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.
- Rigney, A. (2018). Remembrance as remaking: memories of the nation revisited. *Nations and Nationalism*, 24(2), 240-257
- Teevan, C. (2019). *EU-Morocco: a win-win partnership*. Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, 1-15
- True, J. L., Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2019). Punctuated-equilibrium theory: explaining stability and change in public policymaking. In *Theories of the policy process* (pp. 155-187). Routledge.
- Turner, J. C.; Oakes, P. J.; Haslam, S. A.; McGarty, C. (1994). Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5), 454–463. doi:10.1177/0146167294205002
- Van der Heijden K. (2000). Scenarios and forecasting: two perspectives. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*; 65(1).
- van Veen-Croot DB, Nijkamp P, van den Bergh JCJM. (2000). A scenario study for investigating the implications of globalisation on international transport and the global environment: a case study for the Dutch paper industry. In: *Serie research memoranda*, vol. 2000 e3. Amsterdam: Department of Spatial Economics, Free University; 2000.
- Wilensky H.L. (1967), *Organizational intelligence: knowledge and policy in government and industry*. New York, Basic Books Inc, Publishers.
- Wüst, A., & Nicolai, K. (2022). Cultural diplomacy and the reconfiguration of soft power: Evidence from Morocco. *Mediterranean Politics*, 1-26.
- Zardo, F., & Cavatorta, F. (2019). Friends will be friends? External–domestic interactions in EU-Tunisia and EU-Morocco security cooperation after the uprisings. *International Politics*, 56(5), 678-696.