LES PROBLEMES D’AGENCE DANS LE FINANCEMENT DE LA BANQUE ISLAMIQUE : UNE ETUDE EXPLORATOIRE POUR LE CAS DU MAROC

Omar AKHSAS

Résumé


The objective of this work is to explore the issue of agency problems in the Islamic finance industry in Morocco. Particularly in the financing formulas based on the principle of sharing profits and losses. Thus, we have conducted an analogous reasoning that allowed us to draw lessons about the agency problems in Islamic banking, based on the observation of the credit relationship between a Moroccan bank and the young promoters benefiting from  "Moukawalati"program. Our results predict a high degree of moral hazard in the behavior of the borrowers, while the issue of adverse selection remains uncertain. Therefore, we insist on the need to find solutions for agency problems by reducing their effects on the optimal allocation of resources. Other wise, there is a risk that the efforts of Islamic banks will concentrate on non-risky debt contracts, such as "Mourabaha" and "Ijira", to the detriment of risky financing formulas such as "Moudhraba" and " Moucharaka ".


Mots-clés


Asymmetry of information, adverse selection, moral hazard, participative bank, Morocco.

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ISSN : 2489-1290

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